Last Updated: 12 April 2019

 
 
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Defamation is the area of law that is concerned with a person’s damaged reputation. The law previously used the terms ‘libel’ and ‘slander’ however these terms are no longer is use and instead fall under the general term, ‘defamation’. This article is an in-depth guide to the law of defamation written for the everyday person, not for the legal professional. If you would like to read the complex legal technicalities, provided at the end of this article is a list of resources.

Below is an infographic which presents a simple overview on the law of defamation.

Defamation Overview Infographic v7.png
 

Table of Contents


1. What Is Defamation?

2. How Can a Lawyer Help Me?

2.1 If I’ve Been Defamed, or

2.2 If I’ve Been Accused of Defamation

3. If I Go to Court:

3.1. How Much Money Can I Win?

3.2. How Much Money Does a Court Case Cost?

3.3. What Are the Chances That I Will Win?

3.4. Which Lawyers/Law Firms Are Most Experienced in Defamation Court Cases?

4. Additional Information:

4.1. Can I Sue for Social Media or Internet Posts?

4.2. Are Defamation Cases Reserved for the Rich and Famous?

5. Defamation Law: An Overview

5.1. Elements of Defamation

5.1.1. Imputations

5.1.2. Identification

5.1.3. Publication

5.2. Defences to Defamation

5.2.1. The defence of justification;

5.2.2. The defence of contextual truth;

5.2.3. The defence of absolute privilege;

5.2.4. The defence of qualified privilege for provision of certain information;

5.2.5. The defence for publication of public documents;

5.2.6. Defences of fair report of proceedings of public concern;

5.2.7. The defence of fair and accurate report of judicial proceedings;

5.2.8. The defence of fair and accurate report of foreign judicial proceedings;

5.2.9. The defence of fair and accurate report of quasi-judicial proceedings;

5.2.10 The defence of fair and accurate report of parliamentary proceedings;

5.2.11. Defences of honest opinion;

5.2.12. The defence of innocent dissemination;

5.2.13. The defence of triviality;

5.2.14. The defence of consent;

5.2.15. The defence of illegality; and

5.2.16. The defence of time-limitation.

5.3. Who Can Sue for Defamation?

5.3.1. Companies

5.3.2. Partnerships

5.2.3. Unincorporated Associations

5.2.4. Government Bodies

5.2.5. Politicians

5.2.6. Individuals

5.2.7. Non-Australians

5.2.8. Dead People

5.2.9. Third Parties

6. Examples of Defamation Cases

6.1. Imputations:

6.1.1. #MeToo/Sexual Allegations

6.1.2. Harassment

6.1.3. Thief

6.1.4. Sexist

6.1.5. Negligence

6.2. Platforms:

6.2.1. Facebook

6.2.2. Email

7. Further Reading

8. Bibliography

9. About the Author

  1. What Is Defamation?


Defamation is the area of law that is concerned with a person’s damaged reputation. The law previously used the terms ‘libel’ and ‘slander’ however these terms are no longer is use and instead fall under the general term, ‘defamation’. 

Defamatory publications can come in the form of Facebook posts, Twitter posts, emails, internet articles, online business reviews, Google search results, YouTube, blog posts, SMS text messages, newspaper articles, radio shows, television shows, poems, novels, cartoons, paintings, photographs, songs, and so on.

Often, a defamer will not explicitly say what they mean, such as “James Draper is a fraud.” Instead, they will insinuate the meaning. The law calls this interpretation of the publication an ‘imputation’. Some examples of imputations include, “James Draper is a scammer”, “James Draper is a pedophile”, “James draper provides bad services.”

Some other imputations from past cases have included: (James Draper) is a scammer; provides bad services; blames others for his own problems; delays work; deserves to be fired form work; incompetent; mismanages business; deceiving; dishonest; insulting; a scab; is a bully; is a thief; is a pedophile; is a rapist; threatened to kill; threatened to rape; is a criminal; had sex with his sisters; promiscuous; used his employment to elicit sexual relationships; had sex with students; is a sexual predator; is a war criminal; collaborated with Nazis; is trying to institute Nazism into Australia; and so on. 

How Do I Know Whether the Publication is Defamatory? 

Ultimately, this is for the judge and jury to decide. However, the law states that in order for a publication to be defamatory, the typical ordinary person must view the material as likely to damage a person’s reputation. To illustrate, if you hypothetically presented several strangers with the alleged defamatory publication, those people would have to conclude that the publication would damage the person’s reputation. Alternatively, a publication can be defamatory if it is likely to cause a person to be subjected hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or if it is likely to cause a person to be shunned or avoided.

2. How Can a Lawyer Help Me?

The lawyer will assess your situation and provide options for you. This may include the following:

2.1. If I’ve Been Defamed

Concerns Notice: Lawyers may draft, prepare and serve a Concerns Notice. A concerns notice informs the other party the material and its meaning which you believe are defamatory.


Offer to Make Amends: 
The other party has 28 days to respond to the Concerns Notice and to make an offer to repair the situation. This may include a written apology, retraction of defamatory material, publication of a correction, a promise not to publish defamatory material in the future, or compensation. The lawyer may advise you on whether you should accept or reject the offer.


Court: If you think the Offer to Make Amends is not satisfactory, the lawyer may advise you on whether you should initiate court proceedings and they may act on your behalf. 

Remove the Online Post: Lawyers may help you attempt to remove the defamatory material posted online. 


Letter of Demand: Lawyers may draft, prepare and send a letter of demand.

2.2. If I’ve Been Accused of Defamation

 

Offer to Make Amends: When you have received a Concerns Notice, you have 28 days to respond and make an offer to amend the defamatory material. This may include a written apology, retraction of defamatory material, publication of a correction, a promise not to publish defamatory material in the future, or compensation. The lawyer may advise you what you should offer to the other party, if anything.

Court: If the other party commences proceedings against you, the lawyer may offer to act on your behalf. 

2.3. Other

Pre-Publication Review: Lawyers may provide businesses or public figures with pre-publication review services. This where the lawyers will review the material and assess whether this may expose you to unwanted defamation claims.

3.1. If I Win, How Much Will I Get?

A lawyer cannot guarantee you the amount of money the judge will award. However, the following will give you a very general idea based-off past cases and some factors which judges will take into consideration when assessing damages (compensation amount).

Firstly, below is a list of all cases from the past 10 years which have been awarded compensation. This data for this graph was primarily collected from jade.io by examining every case from the last 10 years in the category ‘Communications, Media and Defamation’ and recording the compensation for defamation cases. Note that this graph separates each plaintiff (the person suing) because within the one case, plaintiffs can be awarded largely different amounts.

Compensation for Defamation Cases (2008 - 2018)

 

To download an Excel Spreadsheet of this graph, click here.

As the above graph demonstrates, there is an enormous variation in the amount the judge awards a defamed person. For example, one case was awarded $500 and another case was awarded $850,000. The average award from 2008 to 2018 was $120,276, however, as there is such a wide variation, this is not meaningful. Instead, below is a graph which shows the distribution of awards.

Distribution of Awards for Defamation Cases (2008 - 2018)

Distribution of Awards for Defamation Cases (2008 - 2018)

 

To download an Excel Spreadsheet of this graph, click here.

The above graph shows the most common awards are under $50,000. After $50,000, the likelihood of a higher award becomes progressively less common.

In general, for the lower compensation amounts, the reach of the defamatory material tends to be small, such as to a hand-full of people. For the higher-compensation amounts, the defamatory material tends to be wide-spread over the media, repeated many times over, and or negatively affected the person’s financial situation.

How Does the Judge Determine the Amount of Compensation?

There are three main categories of damages (compensation) which the judge may consider. Firstly, compensation for non-economic loss, secondly, compensation for aggravated damages, and thirdly, compensation for economic loss.

Compensation for Non-Economic Loss: The purpose of awarding damages for non-economic loss is to 1) provide consolation for the person harmed, 2) act as vindication for the person harmed, and 3) act as reparation. For the damages to act as vindication, the damages should in theory be sufficient enough to convince the bystander that the defamer was baseless. 

The court may look at a number of factors when calculating damages for non-economic loss:

  • The court may consider the person’s injured feelings. To prove this, the court may look at whether the person has been ostracised from friends and clubs;

  • The court may consider loss of business.

The maximum for damaged that can awarded for non-economic loss is $389,500. However, this limit can be exceeded with ‘aggravated damages.’ Further, compensation for economic loss does not have a limit. 

Compensation for Aggravated Damages: Aggravated damages may be awarded when the conduct of the defamer increased injury to the defamed. This may include conduct prior to publication, conduct after publication, and conduct at the trial itself. 

Some factors for consideration include: 

  • Whether the defamer failed to make proper inquiries prior to publication;

  • Whether the defamer repetitively published defamatory material; 

  • Whether the defamer retaliated at the defamed for suing them;

  • Whether the apology was inadequate, however an apology is not needed;

  • Whether the publication material was false;

  • And whether the defamer conducted themselves poorly in court, such as arguing baseless defenses.

Compensation for Economic Loss:  Compensation for economic loss seeks to compensate for loss of profit, loss of income, loss of business, loss of employment, loss of opportunity to earn income, and so on. Compensation for economic loss has no maximum amount that can be awarded, however, the court will not engage in speculation and guess work. The court may require an expert to verify or assess the loss. 

3.2. How Much Does a Court Case Cost?

 

Generally, the losing party is ordered to pay the winning party’s legal fees. The costs of going to court is very expensive and can range very roughly from $20,000 to $800,000 or higher. In the case Kostov v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No.1) [2018] NSWSC 1822, the defendant’s (the person who was sued) legal fees totalled $20,000. Alternatively, in the case Moran v Schwartz Publishing Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] WASC 35, the defendant’s fees were estimated to total $780,000. 

3.3 What Are the Chances That I Will Win?

There is no way of determining the odds of success without a lawyer examining your matter. Even then, a lawyer’s estimation is not a guarantee. In saying that, the success rate from past cases may give you some insight. From 2013 to 2017, the plaintiff (the person suing) won only 34.9% of the time. This means, the plaintiff lost 65.1% of the time.

Defamation: Plaintiffs vs Defendants

Plaintiffs vs Defendants: Who Won More Often? (2013 - 2017)

 

Reference: University of Technology Sydney, Centre for Media Transition, Trends in Digital Defamation: Defendants, Plaintiffs, Platforms

Note, we define the defendant to have ‘won’ when the plaintiff’s claim was dismissed for any reason. For example, the imputations were not conveyed, the imputations were not defamatory, the defendant could not be identified, or the defendant’s defence was successful.

 3.4 Which Lawyers/Law Firms are Most Experienced in Defamation Court Cases?

 

The data for the graph below was collected from Lexis Advance by (1) searching for the name of the firm in the ‘representation’ filter, (2) filtering by the topic defamation, and (3) counting the number of different defamation cases up until the end of 2018.

Some notes about data collection. Firstly, cases generally cite the names of the law firms which represented the client, not the names of the individual lawyers. For this reason, names of individual lawyers are excluded as it is extremely difficult to collect this data. Secondly, the kind of defamation cases that are included in this graph is broad. For example, it includes defamation trials, application for leave to initiate defamation proceedings as a vexatious litigant, appeals, application to extend time in order to initiate defamation proceedings, security for costs for defamation proceedings, application for jury trial, discovery, summary dismissal, application to strike-out imputations, etc. Note that many matters included many proceedings and they were only counted as one. For example, application for strike-out imputations, the trial itself, and many appeals were counted as one case, not multiple cases. Thirdly, while this is as accurate as one can reasonably be, there may be a case or two that is missing or added. Fourthly, the data was collected at the start of 2019 and most firms advertised defamation services on their website. Firms which did not advertise defamation services on their website and had zero defamation cases were not included in this graph due to irrelevance.

Which Lawyers/Law Firms are Most Experienced in Defamation Litigation?

 

As shown from the graph above, the top five most experienced law firms for running defamation court cases are (1) Banki Haddock Fiora, (2) Johnson Winter & Slattery Lawyers, (3) Gilbert + Tobin, (4) Goldsmiths Lawyers / Australian Defamation Lawyers, and (5) Mark O’Brien Legal (excluding the ‘big six firms’).

4.1. Can I Sue for Social Media or Internet Posts?

Absolutely. In fact, from 2013 to 2017, 51% of cases were digital defamation cases.

Percentage of Digital to Non-Digital Defamation Cases (2013 - 2017)

Percentage of Digital to Non-Digital Defamation Cases (2013 - 2017)

 

Reference: University of Technology Sydney, Centre for Media Transition, Trends in Digital Defamation: Defendants, Plaintiffs, Platforms


For interest, the graph below shows which platforms are most common for digital defamation. This includes Facebook, Twitter, Google, email, text messages, and non-mainstream websites.

Which Digital Platforms were Most Common for Defamation Cases (2013-2017)

Which Digital Platforms were Most Common for Defamation Cases (2013-2017)

 

4.2. Are Defamation Cases Reserved Only for the Rich & Famous? No.

 

Traditionally, defamation cases have involved public figures against media organisations. However, this has changed over the years. From 2013 to 2017, only 21% of cases were initiated by ‘public figures’ which means 79% of defamation cases were initiated by everyday people. Note, a ‘public figure’ is defined by people who are celebrities, high profile politicians, local council/government members, ambassadors, high profile doctors, lawyers, and businessmen/women.

Percentage of Cases for 'Public Figures' and Everyday People (2013 - 2017)

Percentage of Cases for 'Public Figures' and Everyday People (2013 - 2017)

 

Reference: University of Technology Sydney, Centre for Media Transition, Trends in Digital Defamation: Defendants, Plaintiffs, Platforms

Furthermore, from 2013 to 2017, only 25.9 of defendants were media organisations. This means everyday people are litigating defamation matters more often than public figures and media organisations.

5. Defamation Law: An Overview


This section provides a description on the law of defamation in Australia. There are two major components. (1) The ‘elements’ of defamation and (2), the defences to defamation. The elements of defamation are broken into three parts: (a) the imputations; (b) identification; and (c) publication. There are series of defences and these are listed below in contents. Additionally, other matters which are important to defamation law in include (3) who can sue for defamation?

Each will be addressed accordingly. But before, the law of defamation is quite complex, so while the following section is written for the everyday person, some general legal terms need to be used.

 

General Legal Terms 

  • Plaintiff = The person suing.

  • Defendant = The person defending themselves.

  • Matter = An article, report, advertisement, newspaper, magazine, report, television, radio, the internet, letter, note, picture, gesture, spoken word, etc.

  • Imputation = The interpretation of the matter. For example, an article may not explicitly say that the plaintiff is a fraud, but we know in actuality that this is what the article is insinuating. Thus, in this case, imputation would be: ‘The plaintiff is a fraud.’

5.1. The Elements of Defamation

Contents

5.1. Elements of Defamation

5.1.1. Imputations

5.1.2. Identification

5.1.3. Publication

 

5.1.1. Imputations


5.1.1.1. Summary


Often, the defendant will not explicitly say what they mean. For example, ‘James Draper is a fraud.’ Instead, they insinuate that he is a fraud within the publication. The law calls this interpretation of the publication an ‘imputation’.

 

Firstly, the court must agree with the plaintiff that the publication conveys the imputations which the plaintiff alleges. Secondly, if the court agrees that the publication does convey the imputation, the court must then decide whether the imputation is actually defamatory or not.

 

There are three ways that the imputation can be defamatory. One, the typical ordinary person would likely perceive the publication to lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of others. To illustrate, if you hypothetically presented strangers with the alleged defamatory material, those people would likely conclude that the material would damage a person’s reputation. Two, the publication is likely to subject the plaintiff to hatred, contempt and ridicule. Three, the publication is likely to subject the plaintiff to being shunned or avoided, that is, the material is so egregious that people would probably avoid the plaintiff.

 

The plaintiff does not need to prove whether people actually think lower of them, or prove whether they have been subjected to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or prove whether they have been shunned or avoided. Instead, the plaintiff needs to convince the court that the defendant’s publication was so horrendous that it would obviously cause their reputation to be lowered, or subjected to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or shunned or avoided.


5.1.1.2. Step 1: What Does the Matter Impute? (This section is under construction. The Law Project apologises for the inconvenience.)

5.1.1.3. Step 2: Is the Imputation Defamatory? (This section is under construction. The Law Project apologises for the inconvenience)


After step 1 is completed, that is, after the matter’s imputation is established, the next step is to determine whether the imputation is in fact defamatory. The legislation does not address this section of the law, instead it is found in the common law. 1


There are several separate tests to establish whether the meaning is defamatory. They are as follows:

  1. General Test;
  2. Shunned or Avoided;
  3. Hatred, Contempt, or Ridicule.

More than one test is not needed to satisfy a defamatory imputation. The ‘general test’ is seen to be the primary test and the other tests are seen as secondary to the general test.


5.1.1.3.1. The General Test


The general test for whether an imputation is defamatory is found in Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16:

[3] A person's reputation may therefore be said to be injured when the esteem in which that person is held by the community is diminished in some respect.

[36] …whether a person’s standing in the community, or the estimation in which people hold that person, has been lowered or simply whether the imputation is likely to cause people to think the less of a plaintiff.


The principles for the general test include:

  1. The imputation must damage the plaintiff's reputation. 2
  2. To determine whether the plaintiff’s reputation has been damaged, the imputation must likely cause people to think less of the plaintiff. 3
  3. For example, in the classic case Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237, a handmaid was employed by the Sim’s and later employed by the Stretch’s. The Sim’s persuaded the handmaid to work for them again and subsequently sent a telegraph to the Stretch’s which said, ‘[The handmaid] has resumed her service with us today. Please send her possessions and the money you borrowed, also her wages…”. The imputation was that the Stretch’s were in financial difficulties, however, the imputation was held not to be defamatory.

    In Mirror Newspapers Ltd v World Hosts Pty Ltd (1979) 141 CLR 632, The Australian newspaper published an article with the heading, ‘CARPICE OWNER DECLARED BANKRUPT BY COURT’. However, the Newspaper made an error. The restaurant owner did not go bankrupt, instead, the restaurant manager went bankrupt. The article did specify that it was the manager that went bankrupt, however, a person that read the heading may think it was the owner. The restaurant owner sued for defamation with the imputation that he was financially unsound. The High Court held that the imputation was defamatory.

    Note, whether the plaintiff’s reputation has been lowered does not necessarily mean whether the plaintiff’s moral standing has been lowered.4


5.1.1.3.1.1. Business/Professional/Trade Reputation


A person can be defamed not only in their personal reputation but also in their business/profession/trade reputation.


For example, in Mirror Newspapers v Jools [1985] FCA 181 the Daily Telegraph gave the impression in an article that a surgeon made a mistake during an operation which caused the death of a patient. The imputation was that the surgeon was incompetent/negligent. However, it was the anaesthetist that made the mistake, not the surgeon.


Also, in Rogers v Nationwide News Pty Limited [2003] HCA 52, the Daily Telegraph reported that a surgeon’s patient became blind due to the surgeon’s negligence. The imputation was that the patient became blind due to the surgeon’s inadequate performance. However, the surgery itself, even when performed to perfection, carries the risk that the patient will become blind. The patient became blind due to the type of surgery, not due to the performance of the surgeon.


Another example is in Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 225, three newspapers published that a building was leaking substantial amounts of water. The imputation was that the architect who designed the building was incompetent. Click footnote for more cases.5


A defamatory imputation may include a ‘lack of qualification, knowledge, skill, capacity, judgment or efficiency in the conduct of his trade or business or professional capacity.’6 An imputation of dishonesty may also be defamatory.7


The principles for business/professional/trade reputation include:

  1. The same general test applies to a person’s personal reputation, a person’s business reputation, or a person’s professional reputation.8
  2. If the imputation is in relation to a person’s business, the imputation must involve ‘some reflection upon his personal character or upon the mode in which he carries on his business, his business reputation.’9 In John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Gacic [2007] HCA 28, Gleeson CJ And Crennan J at [2] provides a hypothetical example:

    "Suppose someone says: "X is a thoroughly decent person, but he is showing signs of age; his eyesight is poor, and his hands tremble". That would not be a reflection on X's character. It would be likely to evoke sympathy rather than hatred, ridicule or contempt. If, however, X were a surgeon, the statement could be damaging. To say that someone is a good person, but a dangerously incompetent surgeon, is clearly likely to injure the person's professional reputation."

    However, there is not necessarily a dichotomy between a person's character and their business reputation.10

  3. Reputational damage to a person’s business or goods does not constitute defamation.11 Instead, damage to a person’s business reputation constitutes defamation. Note the distinction.
  4. A defamatory imputation does not require an imputation of moral fault or defect in personal character.12

5.1.1.3.1. Shunned or Avoided (This section is under construction. The Law Project apologises for the inconvenience.)


Another test for whether the imputation is defamatory is if the imputation is likely to cause others to shun or avoid the plaintiff. 13


Some examples of 'shunned or avoided' include:

  • In Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures Ltd (1934) 50 TLR 581 a woman was falsely accused of being raped.
  • In Morgan v Lingen (1863) 8 LT 800, the plaintiff was accused of being insane.
  • In Henry v TVW Enterprises Ltd (1990) 3 WAR 474, an imputation of hepatitis B was held to be defamatory.
  • In the old case of Villers v Monsley (1769) 2 Wils 403, the plaintiff was falsely accused of having a serious contagious or infectious disease. The defendant had written about the plaintiff saying that he smelt of brimstone and one of the lines included, ‘You old stinking, old nasty, old itchy old toad…’ Lord Wilmot, CJ held:

    "...if any man deliberately or maliciously publishes any thing in writing concerning another which renders him ridiculous, or tends to hinder mankind from associating or having intercourse with him, an action well lies against such publisher. I see no difference between this and the cases of leprosy and plague; and it is admitted that an action lies in those cases ...Nobody will eat, drink, or have any intercourse with a person who has the itch and stinks of brimstone; therefore I think this libel actionable, and that judgment must be for the plaintiff."

    Gould, J concurring with Wilmot, CJ held:

    "What is the reason why saying a man has the leprosy or plague is actionable? [It] is because the having of either cuts a man off from society; so the writing and publishing maliciously that a man has the itch and stinks of brimstone, cuts him off from society. I think the publishing any thing of a man that renders him ridiculous is a libel and actionable..."

  • In Zbyszko v New York American Inc (1930) 239 NYS 411, the plaintiff, a wrestler, was compared having the appearance of a primitive gorilla.14

An example of an imputation which does not cause the plaintiff to be shunned or avoided is referring to the plaintiff as ugly.15


The principles for 'shunned or avoided' include:

  1. It is not a requirement that the plaintiff’s reputation is damaged.16
  2. It is irrelevant whether the plaintiff is at fault or whether the plaintiff is immoral.17

5.1.1.3.3. Hatred, Contempt, or Ridicule


An imputation may be defamatory if it exposes the plaintiff the ‘hatred, contempt, or ridicule.’18


The principles for 'hatred, contempt' or ridicule' include:

  1. The phrase ‘calculated to injure’ (from the founding case Parmiter v Coupland and Another (1840) 151 ER 340) means objectively ‘objectively likely’ to injure, not ‘subjectively intended’ to injure.19
  2. It is not a requirement that the plaintiff’s reputation is damaged.20
  3. While the ‘hatred contempt or ridicule’ test has been criticised, the test is still working and in operation.21

5.1.1.3.3.1. Ridicule


An imputation may be defamatory if it is likely to cause the plaintiff to be ridiculed. Some examples of ridicule include:

  • In Boyd v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 449, the plaintiff was a professional rugby league player and a newspaper contained the heading, ‘BOYD IS FAT, SLOW AND PREDICTABLE’ and later described Boyd as ‘waddling’ on to the field.
  • Or, in Ettingshausen v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 443, the plaintiff was photographed naked in the shower and the photo was published in a magazine.
  • In McDonald v North Queensland Newspaper Company Ltd [1997] 1 Qd R 62, the plaintiff was a rugby league player and a newspaper published a photograph showing the plaintiff ‘passing the football while being tackled and, in each, part of his penis was visible outside the right leg of his shorts.’

The principles for ridicule include:

  1. The plaintiff must be subjected to ‘more than a trivial degree of ridicule’.22
  2. It is irrelevant whether the plaintiff is at fault.23

5.1.1.3.4. General Principles (This section is under construction. The Law Project apologises for the inconvenience.)


The following principles apply to all three tests where appropriate:

  1. It is irrelevant what the defendant intended the matter to mean. The tests are objective and must be viewed through the lens of the ordinary reasonable person.24 Other names for the 'ordinary reasonable person' include: 'ordinary reasonable reader (listener or viewer)’;25 'hypothetical referee’;26 ‘hypothetical audience’;27 ‘ordinary decent folk’;28 'fair minded reader’;29 ‘reasonable men’;30 ‘ordinary men’;31 ‘ordinary good and worthy subject of the King';32 ‘standard’;33 ‘yardstick’.34 Note that the name, ‘right thinking members of society generally’,35 is rejected.36 Further note that "[w]hether all these characterisations remain relevant … is open to question."37
    1. The qualities of the 'ordinary reasonable person' include:
      • The ordinary reasonable person "does not live in an ivory tower".38
      • The ordinary reasonable person "is not inhibited by a knowledge of the rules of construction. So he can and does read between the lines in the light of his general knowledge and experience of worldly affairs."39

      • The ordinary reasonable person is "expected to bring to the matter in question their general knowledge and experience of worldly affairs."40
      • The ordinary reasonable person has a "general knowledge of the ways of people and the world against which the words must be construed."41
      • The ordinary reasonable person "is a layman not a lawyer and … his capacity for implication is much greater than that of a lawyer."42
      • The more sensational the matter, the less analytical care the ordinary reasonable person will take.43
      • The ordinary reasonable person is not "avid for scandal".44
      • The ordinary reasonable person does not have background knowledge of the situation.45
      • The ordinary reasonable person does not have "special knowledge".46
      • The ordinary reasonable person is not "morbid".47
      • The ordinary reasonable reader is not "suspicious of mind"48 or have views of extreme "suspicion".49
      • The ordinary reasonable person does not have views of extreme "cynicism (on the one hand) or naivety and disbelief (on the other)."50
      • The ordinary reasonable person is not "perverse".51
      • The ordinary reasonable person "may be ‘described as "of ordinary intelligence, experience, and education""52 or "fair average intelligence".53
      • The ordinary reasonable person is "fair-minded".54
      • The ordinary reasonable person strikes a balance between extreme views.55
      • The ordinary reasonable person is "taken to have a uniform view of the meaning of the language used".56
      • The ordinary reasonable person does not morally judge the plaintiff.57

      The rationale for the ordinary reasonable person is explained by Kirby J in Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers Limited [1998] HCA 37 at [134]:

      "In practice, the tribunal of fact, judge or jury, will ask itself about its own response to the matter complained of. To a very large extent that response will be impressionistic, subjective and individual to the decision-maker. The point of the invocation of the hypothetical reasonable person is to remind decision-makers that they may, or may not, reflect the response of the average recipient of the communication and should make allowance for that possibility."

    2. The ordinary reasonable person takes the views of the general community, not sections of the community.58
      1. The ‘general community’ does not mean all of the community. An ‘appreciable and reputable section of the community’ is sufficient.59 For example, in Hepburn v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [1983] 2 NSWLR 682, Hutley JA argued at 686 that someone who terminate pregnancies (plaintiff) may be seen as immoral by a substantial section of the community which can result in hatred, ridicule or contempt, but another section of the community may not see the plaintiff as immoral.
  1. David Rolph, Defamation Law (Thomson Reuters, 2016) 6.220.

  1. The following phrases are different expressions of the one point:

    • "It is disparagement of reputation which is the essence of an action for defamation.": Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16, [32].
    • "[Damage is] the gist of an actionable imputation.": Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56, [3].
    • "[I]t is defamation's concern with reputation, and the significance to be given to damage (as being of the gist of the action)...": Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56, [42].
    • "The essence of the action in defamation was that the publication of defamatory matter operated as a disparagement of the plaintiff's reputation": Mirror Newspapers Ltd v World Hosts Pty Ltd (1979) 141 CLR 632, [11].
    • "At common law, in general, an imputation, to be defamatory of the plaintiff, must be disparaging of him.": Boyd v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 449, [11].

  1. The following phrases are different expressions of the one point:

    • "…[whether the publication would] tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally.": Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237 at 1240. However, the words ‘right-thinking’ have been criticised on several occasions. In Slatyer v Daily Telephraph Co Ltd (1908) 6 CLR 1 at 7:

      "The only criticism that I have to make upon that passage, and indeed upon the whole of the judgment, which, I think, accurately expresses the law and the proper rule to be applied to the case, is as to the use of the phrase “right thinking ” which has unfortunately come to have an ambiguous meaning. But, read in the light of the context, it obviously means a man of fair average intelligence."

      And in Potts v Moran (1976) 16 SASR 284 at 303:

      "I prefer to make the criterion the estimation of the reasonable man rather than the right thinking man, a phrase which, to my mind, involves questionbegging assumptions and circuity of reasoning. It is hard to feel much confidence in a conclusion drawn from a conflation of the two propositions, “This conduct is wrong because right thinking persons condemn it” and “Right thinking persons condemn this conduct because it is wrong”."

      Finally, in Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16 at [38]:

      "The expression "right‑thinking" should not be taken to refer to the application by the hypothetical referee of moral or social standards, those referable to general character. Such an approach might also limit the application of the general test. It should be understood as a rejection of a wrong standard, one not held by the community. It should be taken to describe a person who shares the standards of the general community and will apply them."

    • "…[whether the publication] is likely to cause ordinary decent folk in the community, taken in general, to think the less of [the plaintiff].": Gardiner v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1942) 42 SR(NSW) 171, 172 (Jordan CJ).
    • "[The publication is] of a kind that is likely to lead ordinary decent folk to think less of the person about whom it is made.": Consolidated Trust Co Ltd v Browne (1948) 49 SR (NSW) 86, 88.
    • "…a statement about the plaintiff of a kind likely to lead the recipient as an ordinary person to think the less of him.": Mirror Newspapers Ltd V World Hosts Pty Ltd (1979) 141 CLR 632, [11].
    • "To be defamatory of the plaintiff, the imputation relied upon must be such as is likely to cause ordinary decent folk in the community, taken in general, to think the less of him.": Boyd v Mirror Newspapers [1980] 2 NSWLR 449, 452 (Hunt J).
    • "So far as is relevant to the matter now under consideration, the legal issue which had to be decided was whether the material complained of was defamatory of the plaintiff in the sense that it was to his "discredit ... [tended] to lower him in the estimation of others [(Gatley on Libel and Slander, 8th ed (1981) par 31)].": Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers Limited [1998] HCA 37, [57].
    • "A person's reputation may therefore be said to be injured when the esteem in which that person is held by the community is diminished in some respect.": Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16, [3].
    • "…whether a person’s standing in the community, or the estimation in which people hold that person, has been lowered or simply whether the imputation is likely to cause people to think the less of a plaintiff.": Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16, [36].

  1. Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16 at [37]:

    "The reference in the general test, as stated in Sim v Stretch, to a plaintiff being "lowered in the estimation" of the hypothetical referee does not imply the exercise of a moral judgment, on their part, about the plaintiff because of what is said about that person. It does not import particular standards, those of a moral or ethical nature, to the assessment of the imputations. It simply conveys a loss of standing in some respect."

  1. I give credit to Kim Gould for compiling this list in 'The Common Law Tests of Defamatory Meaning in the Wake of Radio 2UE Sydney v Chesterton' (2015) 41 Australian Bar Review at footnote 261:

    "Pratten v Daily Labour [1926] VLR 115; Potts v Moran (1976) 16 SASR 284 (politician) ; Fairfax v Punch (1980) 31 ALR 624 (politician); Baric v Doherty [1987] Aust Torts Reports 80-135 (solicitor); Queensland Newspapers v Palmer [2011] QCA 286; Pratten v Daily Labour Ltd [1926] VLR 115 (politician); Random House Australia v Abbott (1999) 94 FCR 296 (politician); Brander v Ryan (2000) 78 SASR 234 (politician); Steiner Wilson & Webster Pry Ltd v Amalgamated Television Services Pry Ltd (2000) Aust Torts Reports 81-537 (ACTSC) (business); Shepheard v Whitaker (1875) LR 10 CP 502 (business); Aspro Travel Ltd v Owners Abroad Group plc [1995] 4 All ER 728 (CA) (business); Coyne v Citizen Finance Ltd (1991) 172 CLR 211 (business); Hewitt v Queensland Newspapers Pry Ltd (SC(ACT), Higgins J, 5 June 1995, unreported) (business); Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524 (CA) (business)."

  1. Drummond-Jackson v British Medical Association [1970] 1 WLR 688, 699.

  1. Mularczyk v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 467, [34]:

    "The imputation of dishonesty alleged was the absence of a quality which, I consider, must be taken as being an essential attribute of a teacher in the proper performance and discharge of his or her professional duties. To be said to be dishonest directly reflects on both the personal and professional character and qualities of persons in the position of the appellants. To return to the submission put by counsel for the appellants, the imputation could admit of only one answer, namely that it was defamatory."


    Charlwood Industries Pty Ltd v Brent [2002] NSWCA 201, [19]:

    "Ordinarily, the imputation that a person has lied or is guilty of dishonest behaviour will be regarded as defamatory. This inference will be even more readily drawn if the imputation is that the person lied or was dishonest in the course of his or her business."

  1. Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16, [36]:

    "The concept of "reputation" in the law of defamation comprehends all aspects of a person's standing in the community. It has been observed that phrases such as "business reputation" or "reputation for honesty" may sometimes obscure this fact. In principle therefore the general test for defamation should apply to an imputation concerning any aspect of a person's reputation. A conclusion as to whether injury to reputation has occurred is the answer to the question posed by the general test, whether it be stated as whether a person's standing in the community, or the estimation in which people hold that person, has been lowered or simply whether the imputation is likely to cause people to think the less of a plaintiff. An imputation which defames a person in their professional or business reputation does not have a different effect. It will cause people to think the less of that person in that aspect of their reputation. For any imputation to be actionable, whether it reflects upon a person's character or their business or professional reputation, the test must be satisfied."

  1. Sungravure Pty Ltd V Middle East Airlines Airliban SAL (1975) 134 CLR 1, [13]:

    "[If the imputation is in relation to a person’s business, the imputation must involve] some reflection upon his personal character or upon the mode in which he carries on his business, his business reputation."


    Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16, [10] (French CJ, Gummow, Kiefel and Bell JJ):

    "It is not in dispute that persons may be defamed in their business reputation. The common law has for some time recognised that words may not only reflect adversely upon a person's private character, but may injure a person in his or her office, profession, business or trade. This may be so where the words reflect upon the person's fitness or ability to undertake what is necessary to that business, profession or trade. But in each case the injury spoken of is that to the person's reputation."

  1. Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16, [46] (French CJ, Gummow, Kiefel and Bell JJ):

    "That moral or ethical standards held by the general community may be relevant to imputations which reflect upon a person's business or professional reputation does not suggest a true dichotomy as between imputations of that kind and those as to character, with different standards applying to each. Rather it confirms as practicable the general test as applying in all cases involving all aspects of reputation."

  1. Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA:

    "[11] The remedy which the law provides for injury to a person's business or professional reputation must be distinguished from that for malicious statements which result in damage not to the reputation but to the business or goods of a person. The former is provided by an action for defamation, the latter by that for injurious falsehood. Lord Esher MR explained the distinction in South Hetton Coal Co Ltd v North‑Eastern News Association Ltd. A false statement that a wine merchant's wine is not good, which is intended to and does cause loss to the wine merchant's business, is an injurious (or "malicious") falsehood. A statement reflecting upon that person's judgment about the selection of wine, and therefore upon the conduct of his business, may be defamatory of him. Gummow J observed in Palmer Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons that the action for injurious falsehood is more closely allied to an action for deceit.

    [12] … Accordingly for present purposes, a publication must have an effect upon the reputation of the plaintiff rather than upon the business, trade or profession of the plaintiff as such."

  1. Drummond-Jackson v British Medical Association [1970] 1 WLR 688, 699 (Lord Pearson): "…words may be defamatory of a trader or business man or professional man, though they do not impute any moral fault or defect of personal character."

  1. Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures Ltd (1934) 50 TLR 581, 587:

    "… the matter is defamatory … if it tends to make the plaintiff be shunned and avoided and that without any moral discredit on their part … [those people] have been held to be entitled to bring an action to protect their reputation and honour.

    One may, I think, take judicial note of the fact that a lady of whom it has been said that she has been ravished, albeit against her will, has suffered in social reputation and in opportunities of receiving respectful consideration of the world."


    Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16, [4]:

    "It was also accepted, as something of an exception to the requirement that there be damage to a plaintiff's reputation, that matter might be defamatory if it caused a plaintiff to be shunned or avoided, which is to say excluded from society."

  1. Zbyszko v New York American Inc (1930) 239 NYS 411 (McAvoy J):

    "The usual allegations as to the defamatory words and pictures are set out, to wit, that they were wholly false and untrue; that the plaintiff enjoyed an international reputation for dignity, fine traits of human character, kindliness, intelligence and culture; that besides being a person of prominence in the field of national and international sports and athletics, the plaintiff was a business man who had many business dealings both in this country and abroad with many worthy persons, who treated and received him on the basis of equality, both physically and intellectually; that the said defamatory words and pictures held up the plaintiff to public contempt, disgrace, hatred, infamy and reproach, caused him to be shunned and avoided and to be treated as an outcast by his wife, relatives, neighbors, friends and business associates, and injured him in his professional calling and deprived him of his standing among good and worthy people."

  1. Berkoff v Burchill [1996] 4 All ER 1008 (Phillips LJ):

    "It is not easy to find the touchstone by which to judge whether words are defamatory which tend to make other persons shun or avoid the plaintiff, but it is axiomatic that the words must relate to an attribute of the plaintiff in respect of which hearsay alone is enough to provoke this reaction. That was once true of a statement that a woman had been raped and would still be true of a statement that a person has a serious infectious or contagious disease, or is physically unwholesome or is mentally deranged. There is precedent for holding all such statements defamatory. There is, however, with one possible exception, no precedent for holding it defamatory to describe a person as ugly. In my judgment, such a statement differs in principle from those statements about a person's physical condition which have been held to be defamatory. Those statements have, in every case, been allegations of fact -- illness, madness, filthiness or defilement. Hearsay factual statements about a person's physical condition can clearly be capable of causing those who hear or read them to avoid the subject of them. In contrast, a statement that a person is ugly, or hideously ugly, is a statement of subjective appreciation of that individual's features. To a degree both beauty and ugliness are in the eye of the beholder. It is, perhaps, just possible to think of a right minded person shunning one of his fellow men because of a subjective distaste for his features. What I find impossible to accept is that a right minded person would shun another merely because a third party had expressed distaste for that other person's features.

    . . .

    My conclusion is that a statement that a person is hideously ugly does not fall into that category of statements that are defamatory because they tend to make people shun or avoid the plaintiff."

  1. Sungravure Pty Ltd V Middle East Airlines Airliban SAL (1975) 134 CLR 1, [54]: "Imputations by which others are likely to be caused to shun or avoid the plaintiff depend not on damage to the plaintiff's reputation, but on the tendency of the imputation to exclude the plaintiff from society."

  1. Alexander v. Jenkins (1892) 1 Q.B. 797, 800 (Lord Herschell): "It is not necessary that there should be imputation of immoral or disgraceful conduct."


    Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd (1934) 50 TLR 581, 587: "[t]he question whether [the plaintiff] is or is not the more or less moral seems . . . immaterial in considering this question whether she has been defamed."


    John Fairfax v Punch (1980) 31 ALR 624, 632-3.


    Random House Australia Pty Ltd v Abbott [1999] FCA 1538, [22].


    Ettingshausen v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 443, 447:

    "This imputation does not assert any moral blame for the exposure upon the plaintiff himself. It is well accepted law that, to be defamatory of a person, the imputation conveyed concerning him need not assert blame if it nevertheless tends to make other persons shun or avoid the plaintiff — for example, by attributing to him that he is insane: Morgan v Lingen (1863) 8 LT 800; or by attributing to her that she has been raped: Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd (1934) 50 TLR 581 at 587."

  1. In Parmiter v Coupland and Another (1840) 151 ER 340, the Hampshire Advertiser newspaper published about the late mayor in the borough of Winchester. The newspaper imputed "partial and corrupt conduct, and ignorance of his duties as mayor and justice of the peace for the borough." Park B. stated that the definition of defamation is, "A publication, without justification or lawful excuse, which is calculated to injure the reputation of another, by exposing him to hatred, contempt, or ridicule." He reasoned, "…any imputation of wicked or corrupt motives is unquestionably libellous; and such appears to be the nature of the publication here."

  1. Ettingshausen v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 443 (Hunt J): "The phrase is calculated to injure used by Parke B should be understood in the sense of has the effect of injuring."


    Carrier v Bonham [2001] QCA 234, [25]:

    "To my mind, however, the problem is that the expression “calculated” which is used in those passages is one of those weasel words that is capable of meaning either subjectively contemplated and intended, or objectively likely to happen. ... The implication I draw from the context in which the word appears in the passages quoted is that it was being used in the latter and not the former sense."


    Y and Z v W [2007] NSWCA 329 at [22]:

    “Calculated” in the test does not mean intended, since the intention of the publisher is immaterial and the imputation conveyed is determined objectively accordingly to the meaning which the ordinary reasonable person would give to the publication.

  1. David Rolph, Defamation Law (Thomson Reuters, 2016) 6.240.

  1. Tournier V. National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461, 477:

    "On this the judge had directed them that defamatory words were words tending to expose the plaintiff to “hatred, ridicule, and contempt” in the mind of a reasonable man. I do not myself think this ancient formula is sufficient in all cases, for words may damage the reputation of a man as a business man, which no one would connect with hatred, ridicule, or contempt."


    Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237, 1240:

    "Judges and textbook writers alike have found difficulty in defining with precision the word ‘defamatory’. The conventional phrase exposing the plaintiff to hatred, ridicule, or contempt is probably too narrow."


    Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16, [4]:

    "An earlier test asked whether the words were likely to injure the reputation of a plaintiff by exposing him (or her) to hatred, contempt or ridicule but it had come to be considered as too narrow.""

  1. Burton v. Crowell Pub. Co. 82 F.2d 154 (1936), [1]:

    "In conclusion therefore we hold that because the picture taken with the legends was calculated to expose the plaintiff to more than trivial ridicule, it was prima facie actionable…"


    Ettingshausen v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 443, 448-9:

    "Applying the principle discussed in Burton v Crowell Pub Co to the present case, I am satisfied that imputation (b) is capable of defaming the plaintiff. Upon the assumption that the ordinary reasonable reader did not conclude that the plaintiff deliberately permitted the photograph to be taken of him with his genitals exposed for reproduction in a publication with a widespread readership — which is the only basis upon which this imputation will fall to be considered — the publication of this imputation is in my view capable of subjecting the entirely blameless plaintiff to a more than a trivial degree of ridicule. It was not seriously argued to the contrary. Accordingly, the imputation is capable of defaming the plaintiff."


    Hanson-Young v Bauer Media Ltd (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 2029, [20]:

    "The Court held that, because the advertisement was calculated to expose the plaintiff to more than trivial ridicule, it was prima facie actionable. The fact that it did not "assume to state a fact or an opinion" was irrelevant."

  1. Boyd v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 449, [17]:

    "The defendant then submits that it is not capable of defaming the plaintiff to say that he appeared to be ridiculous, without any suggestion of fault on his part. The line of authority to which I have already referred above disposes of that submission."


    Ettingshausen v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 443, 447:

    "This imputation does not assert any moral blame for the exposure upon the plaintiff himself. It is well accepted law that, to be defamatory of a person, the imputation conveyed concerning him need not assert blame if it nevertheless tends to make other persons shun or avoid the plaintiff — for example, by attributing to him that he is insane: Morgan v Lingen (1863) 8 LT 800; or by attributing to her that she has been raped: Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd (1934) 50 TLR 581 at 587."

  1. Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16.


    Mirror Newspapers Ltd v World Hosts Pty Ltd (1979) 141 CLR 632, at [11].

  1. Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden (1998) 43 NSWLR 158, 165 (Hunt CJ, Mason P and Handley JA agreeing).

  1. Reader’s Digest Services Pty Ltd v Lamb (1982) 150 CLR 500, 506.

  1. Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16, [6].

  1. Consolidated Trust Co Ltd v Browne (1948) 49 SR (NSW) 86, 88 (Jordan CJ).


    Boyd v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 449, 452 (Hunt J).


    John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Gacic [2007] HCA 28, [53] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).

  1. Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234, 268 (Lord Morris).

  1. Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty (1882) LR 7 App Cas 741, 745.

  1. Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234, 260.

  1. Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB 818, 833.

  1. Kim Gould, 'The Common Law Tests of Defamatory Meaning in the Wake of Radio 2UE Sydney v Chesterton' (2015) 41 Australian Bar Review 50.

  1. Kim Gould, 'The Common Law Tests of Defamatory Meaning in the Wake of Radio 2UE Sydney v Chesterton' (2015) 41 Australian Bar Review 50.

  1. Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237, 1240 (Lord Atkin).

  1. Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16:

    "[38] The expression "right‑thinking" should not be taken to refer to the application by the hypothetical referee of moral or social standards, those referable to general character. Such an approach might also limit the application of the general test. It should be understood as a rejection of a wrong standard, one not held by the community. It should be taken to describe a person who shares the standards of the general community and will apply them.

    [39] The expression has been criticised. Griffith CJ in Slatyer v The Daily Telegraph Newspaper Co Ltd considered it to be ambiguous, but thought that it was intended to refer to a person of "fair average intelligence" and otherwise accepted the test as stated in Sim v Stretch. Murphy J in Reader's Digest Services Pty Ltd v Lamb also thought its meaning was unclear. Bray CJ in Potts v Moran considered that it involved "question‑begging assumptions and circuity of reasoning.""

  1. David Rolph, Defamation Law (Thomson Reuters, 2016) 6.80.

  1. Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234, 258.


    Favell v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 52, [10].


    Farquhar v Bottom [1980] 2 NSWLR 380, 386.

  1. Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234, 258.


    Favell v Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd [2005] HCA 52, [10].


    Farquhar v Bottom [1980] 2 NSWLR 380, 386.

  1. Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16, [6].

  1. Cornes v the Ten Group Pty Ltd and Ors [2012] SASCFC 99, [52] (Kourakis CJ).

  1. Farquhar v Bottom [1980] 2 NSWLR 380, 386.

  1. Amalgamated Television Services v Marsden (1998) 43 NSWLR 158, 12:

    "The reader of a book, for example, is assumed to read it with more care than he or she would read a newspaper. The more sensational the article in a newspaper, the less likely is it that the ordinary reasonable reader will have read it with the degree of analytical care which may otherwise have been given to a book, and the less the degree of accuracy which would be expected by the reader. The ordinary reasonable reader of such an article is understandably prone to engage in a certain amount of loose thinking. There is a wide degree of latitude given to the capacity of the matter complained of to convey particular imputations where the words published are imprecise, ambiguous, loose, fanciful or unusual."

  1. Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234. 258.


    Farquhar v Bottom [1980] 2 NSWLR 380, 368.


    John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Rivkin [2003] HCA 50, [26].


    Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16, [6].

  1. Haddon v Forsyth [2011] NSWSC 123 (Simpson J):

    "[17] In the circumstances of the present case, the exercise has a degree of artificiality. As will become apparent from what I write below, the emails in this case were published to an extraordinarily limited number of recipients, each of whom had a close association with the environment in which they were published, and in which the events with which they were concerned took place. Most, if not all, had at least some prior knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances. It might, therefore, be expected that they would read the emails differently from the “ordinary reasonable reader” or “hypothetical referee” who did not have that inside knowledge.

    [18] However, the law is plain, and my duty is to approach the determination of whether or not any imputation pleaded was conveyed by reference to the “ordinary reasonable reader” or the “hypothetical referee”, as though the email had been picked up off the street by a casual passer by…"

  1. Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers Limited [1998] HCA 37, [134].

  1. Farquhar v Bottom [1980] 2 NSWLR 380, 368.


    Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden (1998) 43 NSWLR 158 at 165.

  1. Farquhar v Bottom [1980] 2 NSWLR 380, 368.


    Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden (1998) 43 NSWLR 158, 165.

  1. Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers Limited [1998] HCA 37, [134].

  1. Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers Limited [1998] HCA 37, [134].

  1. Farquhar v Bottom [1980] 2 NSWLR 380, 368


    Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden (1998) 43 NSWLR 158, 165.

  1. Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16, [6] (French CJ, Gummow, Kiefel and Bell JJ):

    "'[O]rdinary reasonable people’ may be ‘described as "of ordinary intelligence, experience, and education" [(Spencer Bower, A Code of the Law of Actionable Defamation, 2nd ed (1923) at 37)]".

  1. Slatyer v The Daily Telegraph Newspaper Co Ltd (1908) 6 CLR 1, 7.


    Farquhar v Bottom [1980] 2 NSWLR 380, 368.

  1. Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234, 268.


    Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16, [6].

  1. Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234, 259:

    "Ordinary men and women have different temperaments and outlooks. Some are unusually suspicious and some are unusually naive. One must try to envisage people between these two extremes and see what is the most damaging meaning they would put on the words in question."

  1. Reader’s Digest Services Pty Ltd v Lamb (1982) 150 CLR 500, [7].

  1. Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16, [37]:

    "…the hypothetical referee does not imply the exercise of a moral judgment, on their part, about the plaintiff because of what is said about that person. It does not import particular standards, those of a moral or ethical nature, to the assessment of the imputations. It simply conveys a loss of standing in some respect."

  1. Reader's Digest Services Pty Ltd v Lamb (1982) 150 CLR 500, 506:

    "Whether the alleged libel is established depends upon the understanding of the hypothetical referees who are taken to have a uniform view of the meaning of the language used, and upon the standards, moral or social, by which they evaluate the imputation they understand to have been made. They are taken to share a moral or social standard by which to judge the defamatory character of that imputation … being a standard common to society generally...

    ...

    The defamatory nature of an imputation is ascertained by reference to general community standards, not by reference to sectional attitudes."


    Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16, [6]: "…any standards to be applied by the hypothetical referees, to an assessment of the effect of imputations, are those of the general community."

  1. In Hepburn v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltdi> [1983] 2 NSWLR 682, Hutley JA argued at 686 that someone who terminate pregnancies (plaintiff) may be seen as immoral by a substantial section of the community which can result in hatred, ridicule or contempt, but another section of the community may not see the plaintiff as immoral. Hutley found it ‘startling’ that an imputation accusing the plaintiff to be an abortionist could not be defamatory. Glass JA affirmed the view and stated at 694:

    "[A] man can justly complain that words, which lower him in the estimation of an appreciable and reputable section of the community, were published to members of it, even though those same words might exalt him to the level of a hero in other quarters. Where a television programme has been beamed to a large audience it can be presumed, without special proof, that its viewers will include some who advocate the “right to life” and abhor the destruction of foetuses, whatever the circumstances. In the estimation of such persons the plaintiff can claim to have been disparaged even if abortionist meant lawful abortionist."


    Grundmann v Georgeson [1996] QCA 189, [2] (McPherson J.A.) (referring to differing community views on abortion):

    "And it could not be said that those who thought that were not a substantial, intelligent and reasonable section of the community. That is sufficient, in my view to make the publication defamatory."

5.1.2. Identification

The alleged defamatory material must identify the person claimed to be defamed. Generally, this is straight-forward however there are circumstances in which identification is more difficult. For example, in cases where alleged defamatory material does not explicitly name the plaintiff. Or, in cases where the plaintiff is only identifiable to some people who have prior knowledge of the situation but not identifiable to others. Or, in some circumstances, the defamed person has the same name as the person that the publisher was targeting the material towards.

5.1.3. Publication

 

The plaintiff must establish that the defendant did actually published the matter. In the legal sense, ‘publication’ is the act of communicating defamatory matter – in any form – from one person to another. A publisher is any person or entity that participates in the dissemination of defamatory matter. On the surface, this may suggest that bookstores or news agencies are publishers, however, these people are protected under the defence of innocent dissemination.

 

The minimum number of people that the publication must reach, is one person other than the plaintiff. It is not required that the publication is spread to masses of people.

 

Not only can a defendant be held liable for publishing defamatory material, a defendant can also be held liable for not stopping the continuation of defamation or not removing the defamatory material. For example, in one case, some people stuck posters to a bus shelter which imputed that the political candidate was a Nazi. The bus shelter did not remove the posters in a reasonable time frame and was held to be liable as a publisher.

 

A defendant who repeats the defamatory matter, which originated from another source, can also be liable as a publisher. However, the defendant is likely to be exempt if they were repeating the defamatory material for the purpose of publishing a denial or a contradiction.

5.2. Defences to Defamation

5.2.1. The Defence of Justification (Truth)

The defence for justification protects the defendant in circumstances where the defendant can prove that defamatory imputation is factually true. It does not matter whether the defendant believed the allegation to be true, nor had good intentions, the defamatory imputation must be objectively true. The degree that the allegation needs to be factual does not require perfection. Trivial and irrelevant details that are not factually correct may not ruin the defence of justification.

5.2.2. The Defence of Contextual Truth

The Defence of Contextual truth is where the defendant pleads imputations of their own (called contextual imputations) in addition to the plaintiff’s pleaded imputations. The contextual imputations must be proven true and also outweigh any untrue defamatory imputations. This is best explained through an example.

Imagine that Lauren wrote in a defamatory article about James which imputed that James (a) was drink driving, (b) was taking illegal drugs, and (c) was imprisoned for murder. Now, James sued Lauren and pleaded the first two imputations, (a) drink driving and (a) drugs, but deliberately did not plead the third imputation, (c) murder. This is because the (a) drink driving and (b) drug allegations were factually false but the (c) murder allegation was factually true. In response, Lauren defended herself with the defence of contextual truth and pleaded that her article also imputed that James was (c) imprisoned murder. While the drink driving and drug allegations were defamatory of James, the murder imputation was true and also outweighed the drink driving and drug imputations. The drink driving and drug imputations did not bring any further harm to James’ reputation as the murder imputation already seriously damaged his reputation. As the murder imputation was true, Lauren successfully defended herself with the defence of contextual truth.

Some rules for the defence of contextual truth include:

  • The defendant’s imputations must be substantially different from the plaintiff’s imputations.

  • If the contextual imputations are found to be true, the plaintiff’s defamatory imputations do not further harm the plaintiff reputation. Or, in order words, the contextual imputations must overpower and outweigh the plaintiff’s imputations.

  • The contextual imputations must arise from the publication which the plaintiff complains. It cannot arise from prior or different publications.

5.2.3. The Defence of Absolute Privilege

 

There are three main occasions in which the plaintiff is given a complete defence irrespective of whether the words were repugnant, false, spoken with malice, or damaging. These occasions are court proceedings, parliamentary proceedings and communications between high officers of the state.

 

Firstly, for court proceedings, judges, barristers, solicitors, witnesses, jurors, and parties are all protected by the defence of absolute privilege includes. Secondly, for parliamentary proceedings, the defence of absolute privilege extends to documents published by a parliamentary body, debates of a parliamentary body, giving evidence to a parliamentary body, and documents submitted to a parliamentary body. And thirdly, for high officers of state, some past examples of people who have been protected by absolute privilege include communications by the Secretary of State for India to the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for India; communications between the High Commissioner of Australia, United Kington, and the Australian Prime Minister. Absolute privilege may also protect senior military and naval officers.

5.2.4. The Defence of Qualified Privilege for Provision of Certain Information

 

The defence of qualified privilege for provision of certain information protects the defendant in circumstances where the defendant believes that there is a real public interest in what they published. A public interest cannot be matters of pure gossip, curiosity, or news. Some past cases which have successfully applied qualified privilege include performance and training of a football team, and information about bushfires.

 

In addition to public interest, the conduct of the defendant in publishing the matter must be reasonable in the circumstances. Whether the defendant’s conduct was reasonable, the court may consider:

  • The degree of public interest;

  • The seriousness of the defamatory matter;

  • The quality of sources and whether the defendant made a reasonable inquiry as to the quality of sources;

  • Whether the defendant distinguished between suspicion, allegation, and proven facts;

  • Whether the story was one-sided;

  • Whether the defendant made an irrational inference or illogical inference;

  • Whether the defendant relied on legitimate evidence;

  • Whether the defendant believed in the truth of the imputations;

  • If the story was one sided, whether the defendant took steps to obtain and publish a response from the person; and

  • If the defendant did not intend to be defamatory, whether the defendant could reasonably foresee at the time that the publication would defame the plaintiff.

 

Note, the defence of qualified privilege may be lost if the defendant published with malice.

5.2.5. The Defence for Publication of Public Documents


The defence of publication of public documents protects the defendant in circumstances where the defendant publishes defamatory matter derived from a public document. The defamatory matter can also be derived from a fair copy, a summary, or an extract of the public document. A ‘public document’ includes:

  • Reports and papers published by a parliamentary body. A parliamentary body includes a parliament or legislature of any country; a house of a parliament or legislature of any country; a committee of a parliament or legislature of any country; and a committee of a house or houses of a parliament or legislature of any country.

  • A record of votes, debates or other proceedings relating to a parliamentary body published by or under the authority of the body.

  • Documents presented to a parliamentary body of any country.

  • Documents published by the government of any country.

  • And judgements published by courts and tribunals of any country.


The publication needs to be a fair report of the public documents.

5.2.6. Defences of Fair Report of Proceedings of Public Concern

 

Defences of fair report of proceedings of public concern protects the defendant in circumstances where the defendant publishes defamatory matter derived from a fair report of any ‘proceedings of public concern.’ The defamatory matter can also be derived from a fair copy, a summary, or an extract of any proceedings of public concern. Proceedings of public concern includes:

  • Proceedings of a parliamentary body. A parliamentary body includes a parliament or legislature of any country; a house of a parliament or legislature of any country; a committee of a parliament or legislature of any country; and a committee of a house or houses of a parliament or legislature of any country.

  • Proceedings in public of an international organisation of any countries.

  • Proceedings in public of the governments of any countries.

  • Proceedings in public of an international conference at which the governments of any countries are represented.

  • Proceedings in public of any international court or tribunal.

  • Proceedings in public of a court or arbitral tribunal of any country.

  • Proceedings in public of an inquiry held under the law of any country or under the authority of the government of any country.

  • Proceedings in public of a local government body of any Australian jurisdiction.

  • Proceedings of a learned society (see for example) in Australia or of a committee or governing body of the society. The society’s proceedings must be related to a decision about its members or of those who under contractual control.

  • Proceedings of a sport or recreation association (see for example) in Australia or of a committee or governing body of the association. The association’s proceedings must be related to a decision about its members or of those who under contractual control.

  • Proceedings of a trade association (see for example) in Australia or of a committee or governing body of the association. The association’s proceedings must be related to a decision about its members or of those who under contractual control.

  • Proceedings of a public meeting of shareholders of a public company in Australia.

  • Proceedings of a public meeting in Australia related to the candidature of a person for public office.

  • Proceedings of an ombudsman of any country if the proceedings relate to a report of the ombudsman.

  • And proceedings in public of a law reform body of any country.

 

An exception of this defence is in circumstances where the defendant did not publish the information honestly. Note that publishing in order to make a profit is acceptable.

5.2.7. The Defence of Fair and Accurate Report of Judicial Proceedings

 

‘The defence of fair and accurate report of judicial proceedings’ is similar to the ‘defences of fair report of proceedings of public concern’. The former was created by parliament and the later was created and collated by courts over a long period of time. The two are similar but separate defences.

 

The defence of fair and accurate report of judicial proceedings protects the defendant in circumstances where the defendant published defamatory material derived from court proceedings (see general meaning of judicial proceedings).


The requirements of this defence in order to be protected include, but are not limited to:     

  • The report must be fair. Fairness may be determined by comparing the report to what actually occurred.

  • The defamatory statements must have a connection to the court proceedings.

  • The report must identify who made the statements during court. The report does not need to be a verbatim account, nor does the report need to contain quotes.

  • The report cannot miss fundamental and essential facts. However, not all parts of the situation of event need be included.

  • The report needs to be substantially accurate. While complete accuracy is not required, obvious inaccuracy may be held as not fair.

  • It does not matter whether the statements made in court are factually false. What matters is the statements are reported accurately.

  • The defence must not publish with malice. If published with malice, the defence may be lost.

 

The protected defamatory material may be published before the judicial proceedings have ended. Some examples of circumstances which are protected by the defence includes statements made by witnesses and evidence which the court uses to make its decision. Not all defamatory statements made during court are protected by this defence. Some example of circumstances which may not be protected by the defence include:

  • Defamatory statements made by bystanders.

  • Documents prepared for court, but not used by the court to make its decision.

  • Opinions about the event or the situation. Instead, the report needs to be a factual description of what occurred.

5.2.8. The Defence of Fair and Accurate Report of Foreign Judicial Proceedings

‘The defence of fair and accurate report of quasi-judicial proceedings’ is similar to the ‘defences of fair report of proceedings of public concern’. The former was created by parliament and the later was created and collated by courts over a long period of time. The two are similar but separate defences.

The defence of fair and accurate report of foreign judicial proceedings protects the defendant in circumstances where the defendant published defamatory material derived from foreign judicial proceedings. Although, reports of all countries may not be protected. There must be a public interest in Australia for reporting on foreign judicial proceedings. Curiosity or gossip may not constitute a public interest. In addition, the report must be fair and substantially accurate.

5.2.9. The Defence of Fair and Accurate Report of Quasi-Judicial Proceedings

 

‘The defence of fair and accurate report of quasi-judicial proceedings’ is similar to the ‘defences of fair report of proceedings of public concern’. The former was created by parliament and the later was created and collated by courts over a long period of time. The two are similar but separate defences.

The defence of fair and accurate report of quasi-judicial proceedings protects the defendant in circumstances where the defendant published defamatory material derived from quasi-judicial proceedings. Quasi-judicial proceedings are proceedings of a non-judicial body, such as administrative agencies and tribunals, who exercise their functions and powers in a manner that is analogous to judicial power. For example, the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal, the Mental Health Review Tribunal, and the Swimming Pool Fencing Review Committee. The report must be fair and accurate and there must be a public interest for the report to be released.

5.2.10. The Defence of Fair and Accurate Report of Parliamentary Proceedings

 

‘The defence of fair and accurate report of parliamentary proceedings’ is similar to the ‘defences of fair report of proceedings of public concern’. The former was created by parliament and the later was created and collated by courts over a long period of time. The two are similar but separate defences.

 

The defence of fair and accurate report of parliamentary proceedings protects the defendant in circumstances where the defendant published defamatory material derived from parliamentary proceedings. In order to be protected by this defence, some requirements include:

  • The report must be fair and mostly accurate. It does not matter whether the parliamentarian made a false statement during parliament. What matters is that the publisher accurately reported on the statement.

  • The publisher must not have an improper motive for publishing.

  • The subject matter of the report needs hold a genuine public interest. Note that public interest does not mean what the public will find interesting.

  • The publisher has liberty to choose which parts of the parliamentary proceedings they report.

5.2.14. The Defence of Consent

 

The defence of consent protects the defendant in circumstances where the plaintiff consented to being defamed.

5.2.15. The Defence of Illegality

 

The defence of illegality protects the defendant in circumstances where the plaintiff built their reputation through illegal activity. For example, a drug dealer sues for their damaged drug-dealing reputation.

5.3. Who Can Sue for Defamation?

 

5.1.1. Companies

A corporation cannot sue for defamation. 1 A corporation is ‘any body corporate or corporation constituted by or under a law of any country (including by exercise of a prerogative right), whether or not a public body’. 2 A public body is ‘a local government body or other governmental or public authority constituted by or under a law of any country.’ 3


However, there are two exceptions. For the first exception, there are several components: (1) The corporation employs less than 10 full-time workers. 4 If there are part-time workers at the firm, this will be taken as a fraction of 10 full-time workers. 5 For example, 50 workers who work at 20% of full-time is equivalent to 10 workers who work at 100% of full-time. It is irrelevant whether the worker is under a contract of employment, whether the worker is paid, or whether the worker is a volunteer. 6 (2) The corporation is not related to another corporation. 7 The other corporation may be either: 8 (a) a holding company of another corporation; or (b) a subsidiary of another corporation; or (c) a subsidiary of a holding company of another corporation. (3) The corporation is not a ‘public body.’ 9


The second exception is a corporation who’s ‘objects for which it was formed do not include obtaining financial gain for its members or corporators’. 10 For example, not-for-profit organisations.


If the corporation does sue for defamation, the imputations (what the publication insinuates) must only refer to the corporation’s business, trade, or commerce reputation. 11 To contrast, imputations which refer to things other than the corporation’s business, trade, or commerce may be invalid, such as murder, 12 incest, 13 adultery, 14 forgery, 15 assault, 16 bad manners, 17 or nepotism. 18


For not-for-profit organisations with purchased property that generates income, the organisation may sue for defamation if the publication damaged its property or financial situation. 19


A shelf-company with no business cannot sue for defamation. 20


A person who is part of a corporation, such as an employee, is free to sue for defamation even if the publication refers to both the person themselves and the corporation. 21 Where the publication refers to a company but reflects upon a person within the company, that person may sue for defamation. 22


Where a publication refers solely to a director or an officer of a corporation and not the corporation itself, the corporation itself cannot sue for defamation. 23 Alternatively, where a director or an officer’s actions may reflect upon company itself, the company may sue for defamation. 24 To determine whether the director or officer reflects upon the company, consider (1) the part that director or officer is alleged to have played in the operations of the company and (2) the extent to which the director or office is identified with or considered to be the alter ego of the corporation. 25

  1. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 121(1); Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 9(1); Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 9(1); Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s 8(1); Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 9(1); Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 9(1); Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s 9(1).

  1. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 121(6); Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 9(6); Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 9(6); Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s 8(6); Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 9(6); Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 9(6); Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s 9(6).

  1. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 121(6); Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 9(6); Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 9(6); Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s 8(6); Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 9(6); Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 9(6); Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s 9(6).

  1. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 121(2)(b); Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 9(2)(b); Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 9(2)(b); Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s 8(2)(b); Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 9(2)(b); Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 9(2)(b); Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s 9(2)(b).

  1. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 121(3); Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 9(3); Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 9(3); Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s 8(3); Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 9(3); Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 9(3); Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s 9(3).

  1. Redeemer Baptist School Ltd v Glossop [2006] NSWSC 1201, [20]–[24]; Heartcheck Australia Pty Ltd v Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 555, [7].

  1. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 121(2)(b); Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 9(2)(b); Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 9(2)(b); Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s 8(2)(b); Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 9(2)(b); Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 9(2)(b); Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s 9(2)(b).

  1. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 121(4); Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 9(4); Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 9(4); Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s 8(4); Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 9(4); Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 9(4); Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s 9(4).

  1. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ss 121(2)(b), (6); Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) ss 9(2)(b), (6); Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) ss 9(2)(b), (6); Defamation Act 2006 (NT) ss 8(2)(b), (6); Defamation Act 2005 (SA) ss 9(2)(b), (6); Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) ss 9(2)(b), (6); Defamation Act 2005 (WA) ss 9(2)(b), (6).

  1. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 121(2)(b); Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 9(2)(b); Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 9(2)(b); Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s 8(2)(b); Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 9(2)(b); Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 9(2)(b); Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s 9(2)(b).

  1. South Hetton Coal Co Ltd v North-Eastern News Ltd [1894] 1 QB 133, 138 (Lord Esher MR); D & L Caterers Ltd v D'Ajou [1945] 1 KB 364, 366 (Lord Goddard), 367 (Lord du Parcq); Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Comalco Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 510, 586 (Pincus J); cf Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 225 (Mahoney JA); Bargold Pty Ltd v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 9, 10-1 (Hunt J); Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] AC 534, 547.

  1. Rolph, David, Defamation Law (Thomson Reuters, 2016) 79.

  1. Rolph, David, Defamation Law (Thomson Reuters, 2016) 79.

  1. Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus co v Hawkins (1859) 157 ER 769, 90 (Pollock CB).

  1. D & L Caterers Ltd v D'Ajou [1945] 1 KB 364, 366 (Lord Goddard).

  1. South Hetton Coal Co Ltd v North-Eastern News Ltd [18941 1 QB 133, 141 (Lopes LJ).

  1. South Hetton Coal Co Ltd v North-Eastern News Ltd [1894] 1 QB 133, 138 (Lord Esher MR).

  1. Australian Medical Association (WA) Inc v McEvoy [2012] WASC 50, [8] (Le Miere J).

  1. Church of Scientology of California Inc v Reader’s Digest Services Pty Ltd [1980] 1 NSWLR 344, 356; Palace Films Pty Ltd v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1136, [29] (McCallum J).

  1. Palace Films Pty Ltd v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1136, [37] (McCallum J).

  1. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 121(5); Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 9(5); Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 9(5); Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s 8(5); Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 9(5); Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 9(5); Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s 9(5).

  1. Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Comalco Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 510, 602 (Pincus J).

  1. Bognor Regis Urban District Council v Campion [1972] 2 QB 169, 175.

  1. Bargold Pty Ltd v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 9, 11; Hunt Australia Pty Ltd v Davidson's Arnhemland Safaris (2000) 179 ALR 738, 748 (Spender, Drummond and Kiefel JJ).

  1. Bargold Pty Ltd v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 9, 11.

5.1.2. Partnerships


A Partnership can sue for defamation. 26 The imputations must only refer to the partnership’s business, trade, or commerce reputation. 27 To contrast, an imputation cannot refer to anything else other than the partnership’s business, trade, or commerce reputation. If the imputation reflects both upon the partners of the partnership and upon the partnership itself, the partners can sue for defamation. 28

  1. Cook v Batchellor (1802) 127 ER 83; Forster v Lawson (1826) 3 Bing 452, 457 (Park J); Le Fanu v Malcomson (1848) 1 HLC 637, 666-7 (Lord Cottenham LC), 669-70 (Lord Campbell); Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunication and Plumbing Union v Times Newspapers Ltd [1980] 1 QB 585, 595 (O'Connor J); John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Cojuangco (1988) 165 CLR 346, 358; Todd v Swan Television & Radio Pty Ltd (2001) 25 WAR 284, 298 (Steytler J).

  1. Todd v Swan Television & Radio Pty Ltd (2001) 25 WAR 284, 298 (Steytler J).

  1. Todd v Swan Television & Radio Pty Ltd (2001) 25 WAR 284, 302.

5.1.3. Unincorporated Associations


An unincorporated association cannot sue for defamation. 29 See ‘What Is an Unincorporated Association?’

  1. Cother v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1947) 64 WN (NSW) 154; Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunication and Plumbing Union v Times Newspapers Ltd [1980] 1 QB 585, 595 (O'Connor J).

5.1.4. Government Bodies


It is unclear whether a government body can or cannot sue for defamation.30 Some government bodies have been restrained from suing31 and others have been allowed. 32 The distinction between which government bodies have been restrained and which have not is unclear.

  1. Rolph, David, Defamation Law (Thomson Reuters, 2016) 83-5.

  1. Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] AC 534 at 550, (Lord Keith); Ballina Shire Council v Ringland (1994) 33 NSWLR 680, 691; New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council v Jones (1998) 43 NSWLR 300.

  1. Robertson v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (2003) 58 NSWLR 246, 250-1.

5.1.5. Politicians


Individual politicians can sue for defamation.33

  1. Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 568.

5.1.6. Individuals


All people can to sue for defamation.34

  1. Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunication and Plumbing Union Times Newspapers Ltd [1980] 1 QB 585, 595 (O’Connor J).

5.1.7. Non-Australians


A person or corporation outside of Australia can sue for defamation in Australian Jurisdictions.35

  1. Pisani v Lawson (1839) 133 ER 35.

5.1.8. Dead People


A living person cannot sue for defamation on behalf of a dead person.36 This includes: (1) a defamatory publication about the person after they have died and (2) a defamatory publication about a person who was alive at the time of the publication but later died.37 Except for Tasmania.38 In Tasmania, it is possible for a living person to sue on behalf of a dead person.

  1. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 122(a); Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 10(a); Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 10(a); Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s 9(a); Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 10(a); Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 10(a); Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s 10(a).

  1. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 122(a); Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 10(a); Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 10(a); Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s 9(a); Defamation Act 2005 (SA) s 10(a); Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 10(a); Defamation Act 2005 (WA) s 10(a).

  1. Rolph, David, Defamation Law (Thomson Reuters, 2016) 77; George, Patrick, Defamation Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd Edition, 2017) 233-4.

5.1.9. Third Parties


A third party cannot sue on behalf of the defamed person.39

  1. May v Lane (1894) 64 LJ QB 236, 238; Dawson v Great Northern Railway [1904] 1 KB 277, 281; Defries v Milne [1913] 1 Ch 98, 109.

6. Examples of Defamation Cases

The following is a list of examples of defamation cases. It is divided into two categories. The first category is specific defamatory imputations, for example, “James Draper is a racist”, “James Draper is a pedophile”, “James Draper is a criminal”. The second category is the specific platform, for example, Facebook, Email, or Letter.

6.1. Defamatory Imputations

6.1.1. #MeToo/Sexual Allegation

Case Name: Gayle v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1838

Chris Gayle was a Jamaican cricketer who played for the West Indies team. Mr. Gayle was involved in an awkward interview with a female journalist which made her feel uncomfortable. This interview sparked a wave of articles about Mr. Gayle. The Age, The Sydney Morning Herald and The Canberra Times published at total of 28 articles about Mr. Gayle reaching over a million people. The articles addressed the awkward interview but additionally and separately accused Mr. Gayle of wrongly exposing his genitals to a woman in the cricket changing rooms.


The media admitted that the articles were defamatory but they defended themselves with the defence of qualified privilege and the defence of justification (truth). However, the jury rejected both defences. After the jury’s decision, the media organisations took down the defamatory articles about Mr. Gayle.


The court held in favour of Mr. Gayle and awarded him $300,000 in compensation.

6.1.2. Harassment

Case: Clarke v Larard [2018] QDC 247

Mr. Clarke and Mr. Larard were both business owners who each had a business within a shopping centre. There had been a history of disputes about promotional signs between the shopping centre’s body corporate, Mr. Clarke, and Mr. Larard.


Mr. Larard sent the following email to four committee members of the body corporate:

Hi John and the committee & North coast management,

Can you please send a further formal letter to both Clarkes not to harass or approach me if they have anything to say to myself either through there solicitor or the body Corporate.

Today while returning from the Bank with my Son Christopher in hand two years old, Gerry confronted me in the carpark 11.19 am I had on purpose since I observed him in front of his unit choose to cross the carpark and void him, but Rather than this happening he cut a line direct to me got in front of my babbling about the size of the sign above Café Beerwah that it was 5 metres same as the sign I uses to have above my own shop, and rather than allow me to pass un hindered he got in front of me insisting I acknowledge the size of the sign Insisting I answer him what size Café Beerwah Sign is? I had to physically push my way past the fool more than once, if I did not have my son and carrying bank deposit book and a shopping bag I would have knocked his head off.

I don’t come to operate my business in Turner Park to be harassed by any other owner as I would not myself interfere with the day to day operation of anyone’s business here, No One here because of the Clarkes vexatious frivolous ridiculous actions should be suffering it about time the body corporate took combines legal action against the Clarkes, these special levy’s hurt everyone financially, and appear not to solve whatever the issues are with the Clarkes but it still seems to be we must all be wrong to make the Clarkes right.

Please issue them a letter, they have been asked to respect my privacy, my wish not to receive emails and not to speak to me, I am done ever attempting anything reasonable with the Clarkes, in fact perhaps Tracy can advise what’s involved in a court order that they are then not permitted to approach me or any member of my family.

But first up perhaps an immediate letter from Body Corporate, or our legal representation.


The imputations were:

  1. The plaintiff harassed the defendant and his two year old son by repeatedly using his body to block their path as they walked through the Turner Park Shopping Village carpark, requiring the defendant to push the plaintiff to get past him;

  2. The plaintiff is a fool;

  3. The plaintiff harassed the defendant and his two year old son to such a degree that it would have justified the defendant knocking his head off.


CCTV footage showed that Mr. Clarke did not act aggressively or confrontational towards Mr. Larard. In fact, it was the opposite. Mr. Larard was held to have spoken belligerently and acted aggressively towards Mr. Clarke. The judge held that Mr. Larard falsely accused Mr. Clarke.


The court held in favour of Mr. Clarke and he was awarded $12,000 in compensation. An injunction order was made against Mr. Larard to restrain him from making further allegations about Mr. Clarke.

6.1.3. Sexist

There are no cases (Jan 2019) which have made it all the way to trial containing the plaintiff’s alleged defamatory imputations: “sexist” or “sexism”.

 

Technical Notes: In Tucker v Echo Publication Pty Ltd & Anor [2005] NSWSC 865, the ‘sexist’ imputation was pleaded as contextual truth by the defendant, however the judge held that there was no substantial truth in the imputation. For other ‘sexist’ imputation cases, Capilano Honey Ltd v Mulvany [2018] VSC 672, was for an interlocutory injunction (an order to stop the defendant from posting any further defamatory imputations before the case proceeds to trial), and Eardley v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 1374 was an application to strike-out imputations. The strongest ‘sexist’ case is Wild v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Levine J, 8 August 1997, unreported). The judge held that the imputation was capable of conveying sexism, but it was sent to the jury to decide. There have been no updates since.

Case Name: Wild v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Levine J, 8 August 1997, unreported)

In a publication by the Sydney Morning Herald newspaper, there were 3 images and a body of text with the title, “Catherine Lumby, "In Defence of Female Voyeurism and Sexist Ads". The first image contained a billboard with two naked women displaying their backsides. On their backsides were the superimposed words, “They like to watch” and “In defence of female voyeurism and sexists ads. By Catherine Lumby”. A second image contained a female model in lingerie with rope between her teeth. The third image was underneath the billboard image with Mr. Wild looking towards the billboard but slightly away. Mr. Wild was represented to have balding untidy hair with a long grey beard. The image was captioned with, “revealing end of the market... two of the billboards that have attracted complaints of sexism over the past couple of years, but are they?”


In the publication, a modified section of Catherine Lumby’s book named Bad Girls was displayed. It said, “while the best advertising seduces us, feminism too often simply wants to tell women what ‘real’ women ought to want”. Further, the article stated, “In fact, there is plenty of evidence that contemporary women enjoy mocking and playing with media stereotypes of femininity in much the same way the gay community has adopted and parodied icons of straightness. The enduring popularity of Madonna with her in-your-face sex goddess posturing is one ex-ample. Lisbeth Gorr's aggressive pseudo-flirt routine is another.”


The imputations were:

  1. “The plaintiff (Mr. Wild) is a dirty old man.

  2. The plaintiff is a voyeur.

  3. The plaintiff is a sexist.

  4. The plaintiff is the kind of low individual who would pose in front of a billboard of scantily clad young girls for the purpose of having his photograph in The Sydney Morning Herald.”


The judge held that the imputations were capable of being understood. The case was sent to the jury to determine whether the imputations were in fact conveyed in the Sydney Morning Herald and whether the imputations were defamatory of Mr. Wild. However, as there have been no updates since 1997, presumably the case did not proceed to trial.

6.1.4. Thief

Case Name: Luke v Richardson [2014] WADC 27

Mr. Luke hired a car from a car-hire-company and Ms. Richardson was an employee of that company. Mr. Luke returned the car and Ms. Richardson later requested that he return to the office. When he arrived, she pointed out that the tyres had been replaced with older tyres and that he was responsible for it.


Mr. Luke became angry. For context, he said that his anger was due to his military background and his cultural heritage from Africa. He reacted to Ms. Richardson by speaking loudly and aggressively and accused her of being a racist. In response, Ms. Richardson also became angry and called him a "thief" and a "criminal". Sometime during this event, Mr. Luke threatened to kill her and burn her.


The judge found on the evidence that the tyres were in fact swapped. However, there was no evidence that the tyres were swapped by Mr. Luke himself as other people had driven the car. While Mr. Luke was probably liable for breach of contract, this did not suggest that he stole the tyres or that he was a criminal. The court held that Ms. Richardson’s accusations that he was a "thief" and a "criminal" were defamatory.


Mr. Luke would have been awarded $7,500, however, the judge disapproved of Mr. Luke's accusation that Ms. Richardson was racist. He accused her both during the event itself and during the court hearing. The court held there was no evidence of racism on Ms. Richardson’s behalf. Further, the judge disapproved of the fact that Mr. Luke had threatened to kill and burn Ms. Richardson. Mr. Luke was in the end awarded $1,000 in compensation.

6.1.5. Negligence

Case Name: Al Muderis V Duncan (No 3) [2017] NSWSC 726

Dr. Al Muderis is a surgeon and he performed hip arthroscopy on Mr. Mazzella. Mr. Mazzella later complained that Dr. Al Muderis damaged his pudendal nerves which caused a degree of numbness in his penis and scrotum and a loss of sexual function.

In response, Mr. Mazzella sued Dr. Al Muderis for medical negligence (Mazzella v Al Muderis [2014] NSWSC 1087) however, the judge dismissed the case before it proceeded to trial. Mr. Mazzella engaged with four different law firms in preparation and three law firms ceased representing him. Further, Mr. Mazzella did not comply with many of the pre-trial court orders.

Mr. Mazzella threatened to cut off Dr. Al Muderis’ penis and kill him and posted a series of defamatory publications.

Dr. Al Maderis sued for defamation for five different publications:

  • The first was for a website which was essentially a copy of Dr. Al Muderis’ medical website but with the words changes. Some of the website’s headings included, ‘More Victims’, ‘The Un Accountability of the Surgeon Dr Al Muderis for his medical negligence’, ‘The Video that Dr Al Muderis had blocked on Australian YouTube’. The website also linked to a YouTube video by Mr. Mazzella in which he made a series of allegations about Dr. Al Muderis.
  • The second was for a website which was similar to the first website but with slight variations.
  • The third was for a Facebook post by Mr. Mazzella which appeared on a public Facebook page. The post contained a photo of Dr. Al Muderis and a heading which stated, ‘Dr Al Muderis-Surgeon or Butcher’. The post contained links to the defamatory websites, links to a YouTube video with Mr. Mazzella making allegation about Dr. Al Muderis, and various other links containing images and text.
  • The fourth was for the YouTube video itself where Mr. Mazella spoke about Dr. Al Muderis and made a series of allegations.
  • The fifth was for a Pinterest and Daily Motion post which contained a link to the YouTube video and also contained text which included, “Listen as Mr Mazzella describes the inexcusable actions resulting from mutilation of essential reproductive nerves by this so-called Doctor, or should we say ‘Butcher’. This man is still practicing [sic] … Don’t let him ‘practice’ [sic] on you or your penis.”

There were many imputations. Some of them included:
  • The plaintiff as a surgeon deserved to be found guilty of negligence by the NSW Medical Board;
  • The plaintiff mutilated Gerard’s (a reference to the second defendant) reproductive nerves;
  • The plaintiff’s negligence in his operative and post-operative treatment of Gerard led to a loss of sensation in his penis, thereby destroying his sex life and causing great depression;
  • The plaintiff as a surgeon butchers his patients; and
  • The plaintiff’s gross negligence as a surgeon destroys peoples’ lives.

Dr. Al Maderis had an outstanding reputation. The judge said that Dr. Al Muderis, ‘is in some sense “the perfect plaintiff” in a defamation proceeding. He is involved in charity, works for the Australian Defence Forces, gives of his time and money for persons who are less fortunate and has put Australia at the leading edge of medical technology.’ ‘There can be little doubt that the [Mr. Al Muderis] is a person of extremely high standing and an extraordinarily good reputation, which is deserved.’ Dr. Al Muderis pioneered a new surgical technique and traveled the world teaching other surgeons about his technique. The British military sent their injured soldiers to Australia to be treated by Dr. Al Muderis.

Mr. Duncan and Mr. Mazzella were ordered to pay Dr. Al Muderis $320,000 jointly and Mr. Mazella was separately ordered to pay Dr. Al Muderis $160,000. Dr. Al Muderis was awarded in total $480,000. The court ordered an injunction which prohibited Mr. Duncan and Mr. Mazzella defaming Dr. Al Muderis again. Lastly, Mr. Duncan and Mr. Mazzella were ordered to pay for Dr. Al Muderis legal fees.

6.2. Platforms

6.2.1. Facebook

Case Name: Reid v Dukic [2016] ACTSC 344

Ms. Reid was the CEO of Capital Football and Mr. Dukic was a local football coach. Mr. Dukic had posted about Ms. Reid on his Facebook wall 9 times over 2 years. He had around 400 friends and 5 to 25 people liked each post.


His posts insinuated that Ms. Reid is dishonest, a national disgrace, gender biased, a liar, is grossly incompetent, a despicable person, similar to a communist dictator, and a whole host of other defamatory insinuations.


Ms. Reid sued him for defamation and claimed that his Facebook posts were "ridiculous" and completely false. However, she said that she became concerned that people were starting to believe him and that she was hurt by the people who 'liked' his posts. She also said that she became so emotionally distraught that it started to affect her home life with her partner. A witness in the case said that Ms. Reid was starting to become warn-down and was losing self-confidence. She eventually resigned as CEO, however, she said her resignation was not related to Mr. Dukic's Facebook posts.⁣


Mr. Dukic did not turn up for court and so he had no defence. He was ordered to pay Ms. Reid $182,700 and he was banned from posting about her on Facebook again.

6.2.2. Email

Case Name: Stone v Moore [2016] SASCFC 50

Ms. Stone and Mr. Moore were siblings aged in their 70’s. After their mother died, Mr. Moore made two publications which prompted Ms. Stone to sue for defamation. The first publication was an email sent to Ms. Stone’s son’s wife. The second publication was an oral statement made is the presence of his partner, his nephew and the son of Ms. Stone, and the son’s wife.


For the first publication, Frank responded to an email sent by Ms. Stone. He responded by sending an email to Ms. Stone’s son’s wife which was to be forwarded to Ms. Stone. For context, Ms. Stone was estranged from her mother from the age of 19. Futher, Mr. Frank claimed that the estrangement was due to an abortion which Ms. Stone had. The email said:

Carole,

The funeral now has been confirmed for this Friday. I am inviting only the grand-children and great grand-children to what will be a very small private burial.

I do not consider it appropriate for you to attend.

Yes, I am your brother and we have the same Mother, but only one of us has treated her the way a child should treat its mother. You have been worse than indifferent to your Mother’s well being, you have been callous.

If you believe by attending it will go some way towards alleviating your guilt you are sadly mistaken. It will be seen as an act of gross hypocrisy.

If you would like a private viewing I am willing to instruct the funeral parlour it has my approval to do so.

I can be contacted on [mobile number]

Frank


The imputations were:

  1. By reason of that estrangement Ms. Stone never treated their mother as a child should.

  2. By reason of that estrangement Ms. Stone was worse than indifferent, indeed callous, to [the plaintiff’s] mother’s well-being.

  3. Ms. Stone is a hypocrite.


For the second publication, Frank claimed to have been told by his parents that Ms. Stone had an abortion when she was younger. Frank told Ms. Stone’s son about the abortion and about how she was estranged from their mother. However, the second publication was successfully defended by the defence of qualified privilege.


The court ruled in favour of Ms. Stone for the first publication only and she received $2,000 in compensation.

7. Further Reading

The Law Project recommends the following two textbooks on Defamation. Both books address many of the same topics, however, each enters into varying degrees of depth on each subtopic, each address different points which the other does not, and each explain topics in different ways. One book is not better than the other, instead, both should be used as a reference. The two textbooks are:

  1. Rolph, David, Defamation Law (Thomson Reuters, 2016) 

  2. George, Patrick, Defamation Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd Edition, 2017) 

The Law Project also recommends a looseleaf service titled Australian Defamation Law and Practice by T K Tobin & M G Sexton published by LexisNexis. This comes in the form of either a binder and sections of the binder are updated by physically replacing sections in the binder, or, an online subscription can be purchased through LexisNexis. The benefits of the looseleaf service are: (1) It is written by two QC’s. A Queen’s Counsel (or alternatively named ‘Senior Counsel’) are the highest ranking barristers in Australia. Both Tobin QC and Sexton SC have acted in a large number of defamation cases. (2) It is more likely to be up to date than a textbook as textbooks are updated once per year or once every few years, while looseleaf services are often updated multiple times per year. The negatives of a loose leaf service are: (1) If you do not want to buy a whole subscription, you will need to physically locate the binders somewhere. Try your state library or court libraries, for example, the Law Library of Victoria in the Supreme Court has a copy. (2) The physical binder is not user friendly and it feels archaic. Nevertheless, the information is there and it is of the highest quality.

More defamation articles by The Law Project:

  1. Is the Imputation Defamatory?

Legislation on Defamation:

Other books which address defamation law in Australia:

  1. Baker, Roy, Defamation Law and Social Attitudes: Ordinary Unreasonable People (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011)

  2. Balkin, R P and J L R Davis, Law of Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th Edition, 2013)

  3. Barker, Kit, Peter Cane, Mark Lunney and Francis Trindade, The Law of Torts in Australia (Oxford University Press, 5th Edition, 2012)

  4. Butler, Des and Sharon Rodrick, Australian Media Law (Thomson Reuters, 5th Edition, 2015)

  5. Collins, Matthew, Collins on Defamation (Oxford University Press, 2014) 

  6. Collins, Matthew, The Law of Defamation and the Internet (Oxford University Press, 3rd Edition, 2011)

  7. Davies, Martin and Ian Malkin, Focus: Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 8th Edition, 2017)

  8. Foster, Neil, Torts Cases and Commentary Supplement: Defamation and Wrongful Interference with Goods (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2014)

  9. George, Patrick, Monica Allen, Gerard Basha, Stefanie Benson, Joseph Collins, James Mattson, Justine Munsie, Gabriella Rubagotti, Gavin Stuart and James Whiley, Social Media and the Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2nd Edition, 2016)

  10. Hitchens, Lesley, Media Law in Australia (Wolters Kluwer: Law & Business, 2014)

  11. McNamara, Lawrence, Reputation and Defamation (Oxford University Press, 2007)

  12. Mendelson, Danuta, The New Law of Torts (Oxford University Press, 3rd Edition, 2014) 

  13. Mendelson, Danuta, The New Law of Torts: Case Book (Oxford University Press, 3rd Edition, 2014)

  14. Pearson, Mark and Mark Polden, The Journalist's Guide to Media Law: A Handbook for Communications in a Digital World (Allen & Unwin, 6th Edition, 2019)

  15. Richards, Bernadette and Melissa De Zwart, Tort Law Principles (Thomson Reuters, 2nd Edition, 2016)

  16. Rolph, David, Matt Vitins, Judith Bannister and Daniel Joyce, Media Law: Cases, Materials and Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2nd Edition, 2015)

  17. Sappideen, Caroline and Prue Vines (eds), Fleming′s The Law of Torts (Thomson Reuters, 10th Edition, 2011)

  18. Stickley, Amanda, Australian Torts Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th Edition, 2016) 

8. Bibliography

 

8.1. Legislation

  1. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) - Chapter 9, Sections 115-139N

  2. Defamation Act 2005 (Qld)

  3. Defamation Act 2005 (NSW)

  4. Defamation Act 2006 (NT)

  5. Defamation Act 2005 (SA)

  6. Defamation Act 2005 (Tas)

  7. Defamation Act 2005 (Vic)

  8. Defamation Act 2005 (WA)

8.2. Cases

  1. Ahmadi v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 702

  2. Ahmed v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1928

  3. Akras v Mora (Victorian County Court, Murphy J, 23 August 2012)

  4. Aktas v Westpac Banking Corporation Limited [2010] HCA 25

  5. Al Muderis v Duncan (No 3) [2017] NSWSC 726

  6. Alexander v. Jenkins (1892) 1 Q.B. 797

  7. Ali v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 183

  8. Allen v Lloyd-Jones (No. 6) [2014] NSWDC 40

  9. Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden (1998) 43 NSWLR 158,

  10. Amanatidis v Darmos [2011] VSC 163

  11. Anderson v Gregory [2008] QDC 135

  12. Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 225

  13. Attrill v Christie [2007] NSWSC 1386

  14. Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Comalco Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 510

  15. Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Comalco Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 510

  16. Australian Medical Association (WA) Inc v McEvoy [2012] WASC 50

  17. Ayan v Islamic Co-ordinating Council of Victoria Pty Ltd & Ors [2009] VSC 119

  18. Ballina Shire Council v Ringland (1994) 33 NSWLR 680

  19. Bargold Pty Ltd v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 9

  20. Bauer Media Pty Ltd v Wilson (No 3) [2018] VSCA 164

  21. Belbin v Lower Murray Urban & Rural Water Corp [2012] VSC 535

  22. Bennette v Cohen [2009] NSWCA 60

  23. Berkoff v Burchill [1996] 4 All ER 1008

  24. Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133

  25. Beynon v Manthey [2015] QDC 252

  26. Bognor Regis Urban District Council v Campion [1972] 2 QB 169

  27. Bottrill v Bailey [2018] ACAT 45

  28. Bottrill v Van Lieshout and Ors [2015] ACAT 26

  29. Boyd v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 449

  30. Brennan v Rijicach Pty Ltd & Hickey [2014] SADC 153

  31. Bristow v Adams [2012] NSWCA 166

  32. Bui v Huynh [2011] QDC 239

  33. Bui v Phung (Queensland District Court, 14 October 2011)

  34. Burton v. Crowell Pub. Co. 82 F.2d 154 (1936)

  35. Bushara v Nobananas Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 225

  36. Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB 818

  37. Cables v Winchester [2018] VSC 392

  38. Cantwell v Sinclair [2011] NSWSC 1244

  39. Capital and Counties Bank v. Henty (1882) LR 7 App Cas 741

  40. Carolan v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 6) [2016] NSWSC 1091

  41. Carrier v Bonham [2001] QCA 234

  42. Cerutti v Crestside Pty Ltd [2014] QCA 33

  43. Cha v Oh (No. 22) (Part 2) [2009] NSWDC 300

  44. Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers Limited [1998] HCA 37

  45. Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd v Fisher [2015] NSWCA 414

  46. Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd v Mahommed [2010] NSWCA 335

  47. Cheikho v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 5) [2016] NSWSC 29

  48. Chel v Fairfax Media Publications (No 7) [2017] NSWSC 996

  49. Chow v Un (No. 2) [2017] NSWDC 301

  50. Church of Scientology of California Inc v Reader’s Digest Services Pty Ltd [1980] 1 NSWLR 344

  51. Clarke v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Limited [2012] NSWDC 107

  52. Clarke v Larard [2018] QDC 247

  53. Coates v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd & Anor [2008] NSWSC 292

  54. Conlon v Advertiser -- News Weekend Publishing Co Pty Ltd [2008] SADC 91

  55. Consolidated Trust Co Ltd v Browne (1948) 49 SR (NSW) 86

  56. Cook v Batchellor (1802) 127 ER 83

  57. Cornes v Ten Group Pty Ltd [2011] SASC 104

  58. Cother v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1947) 64 WN (NSW) 154

  59. Cripps v Vakras; Vakras v Cripps [2014] VSC 279

  60. D & L Caterers Ltd v D'Ajou [1945] 1 KB 364

  61. Dabrowski v Greeuw [2014] WADC 175

  62. Davis v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 693

  63. Dawson v Great Northern Railway [1904] 1 KB 277

  64. De Poi v Advertiser-news Weekend Publishing Company Pty Ltd [2016] SASCFC 45

  65. Defries v Milne [1913] 1 Ch 98

  66. Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] AC 534

  67. Dods v McDonald (No.2) [2016] VSC 201

  68. Dossis v Andreadis (No 4) [2012] SADC 114

  69. Douglas v McLernon [No 4] [2016] WASC 320

  70. Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56

  71. Drummond-Jackson v British Medical Association [1970] 1 WLR 688

  72. Duffy & Ors v Trenowden [2010] SADC 152

  73. Duffy v Google Inc. (No 2) [2015] SASC 206

  74. Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunication and Plumbing Union v Times Newspapers Ltd [1980] 1 QB 585

  75. Ell v Milne (No 8) [2014] NSWSC 175

  76. Ettingshausen v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 443

  77. Flegg v Hallett [2015] QSC 167

  78. Foley v Radford [2008] NSWDC 167

  79. Forrest v Chlanda [2012] NTSC 14

  80. Forster v Lawson (1826) 3 Bing 452

  81. Fraser v Business News Group Pty Ltd [2018] VSC 196

  82. French v Fraser (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1807

  83. French v The Herald and Weekly Times Pty Limited (No. 2)

  84. Gacic v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2015] NSWCA 99

  85. Gardiner v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1942) 42 SR(NSW) 171

  86. Gayle v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1838

  87. Gluyas v Canby [2015] VSC 11

  88. Gluyas v John Best Junior [2013] VSC 3

  89. Gluyas v Tenana [2008] VCC 1161

  90. Graham v Powell (No 4) [2014] NSWSC 1319

  91. Grattan v Porter [2016] QDC 202

  92. Greek Orthodox Community Of South Australia Inc & Ors v Pashalis [2015] SASC 122

  93. Gregory v Johnson [2017] QDC 224

  94. Greig v WIN Television NSW Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 632

  95. Griffith & Macartney-Snape v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2008] NSWSC 764

  96. Gunston v Davies Brothers Pty Ltd [2012] TASSC 15

  97. Habib v Nationwide News Pty Limited [2010] NSWSC 924

  98. Habib v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd & Anor (No 4) [2012] NSWDC 12

  99. Haertsch v Channel Nine Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 182

  100. Hallam v Ross (No 3) [2012] QSC 421

  101. Hanson-Young v Bauer Media Ltd (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 2029

  102. Hardie v The Herald Weekly Times Pty Ltd [2016] VSCA 103

  103. Heartcheck Australia Pty Ltd v Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd [2007] NSWSC 555

  104. Henry v TVW Enterprises Ltd (1990) 3 WAR 474

  105. Higgins v Sinclair [2011] NSWSC 163

  106. Hocken v Morris [2011] QDC 115

  107. Hockey v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 652

  108. Holt v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 770

  109. Huang v Zhi & Anor [2017] VCC 1990

  110. Hunt Australia Pty Ltd v Davidson's Arnhemland Safaris (2000) 179 ALR 738

  111. Jeffrey and Curnow v Giles; Giles v Jeffrey and Curnow [2015] VSCA 70

  112. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Cojuangco (1988) 165 CLR 346

  113. John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Gacic [2007] HCA 28

  114. John Fairfax v Punch (1980) 31 ALR 624

  115. Johnston v Aldridge [2018] SADC 68

  116. Kelly v Levick [2016] QMC 11

  117. Korean Times Pty Ltd v Pak [2011] NSWCA 365

  118. Kostov v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No.1) [2018] NSWSC 1822

  119. Kunoth-Monks v Healy and Anor [2013] NTSC 74

  120. Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520

  121. Larach v Urriola [2009] NSWDC 97

  122. Le Fanu v Malcomson (1848) 1 HLC 637

  123. Leech v Green & Gold Energy Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 999

  124. Lesses v Maras (No 2) [2017] SASCFC 137

  125. Lewincamp v ACP Magazines Limited [2008] ACTSC 69

  126. Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234

  127. Linsley v Domaille (aka James) [2009] VCC 554

  128. Luke v Richardson [2014] WADC 27

  129. Machado & Anor v Underwood & Anor (No 2) [2016] SASCFC 123

  130. Manefield v Association of Quality Child Care Centres of NSW Inc [2010] NSWSC 1420

  131. Marshall v Megna; Megna v Tory; Tory v Megna [2013] NSWCA 30

  132. Martin v Bruce [2007] NSWDC 264

  133. May v Lane (1894) 64 LJ QB 236

  134. McMahon v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (No 7) [2013] NSWSC 933

  135. Metropolitan Saloon Omnibus co v Hawkins (1859) 157 ER 769

  136. Mickle v Farley [2013] NSWDC 295

  137. Milne v Ell [2017] NSWSC 555

  138. Mirror Newspapers Ltd v World Hosts Pty Ltd (1979) 141 CLR 632

  139. Moran v Schwartz Publishing Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] WASC 35

  140. Morgan v Lingen (1863) 8 LT 800

  141. Moroney v Zegers [2018] VSC 446

  142. Moumoutzakis v Carpino [2008] NSWDC 168

  143. Mularczyk v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 467

  144. Mundine v Brown (No 6) [2010] NSWSC 1285

  145. Naudin-Dovey v Naudin & Ors [2013] QDC 119

  146. New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council v Jones (1998) 43 NSWLR 300

  147. Newman v Speigler & Anor [2008] QDC 266

  148. Nicholas Polias v Tobin Ryall [2014] NSWSC 1692

  149. North Coast Children's Home Inc. trading as Child & Adolescent Specialist Programs & Accommodation (CASPA) v Martin (No. 2) [2014] NSWDC 142

  150. Nowak v Putland [2011] QDC 259

  151. Ollis v Jenman & Anor [2008] NSWSC 67

  152. P L & Anor v W J A [2008] QDC 34

  153. Pahuja v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 3) [2018] NSWSC 893

  154. Palace Films Pty Ltd v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1136

  155. Parmiter v Coupland and Another (1840) 151 ER 340

  156. Pedavoli v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1674

  157. Perkins v Floradale Productions Pty Ltd & Ors (District Court of NSW, Walmsley SC DCJ, 28 May 2013)

  158. Petrov v Do [2012] NSWSC 1382

  159. Phillips v Robab Pty Limited [2014] NSWSC 1520

  160. Pinksterboer & Ors V Coumi & Ors [2018] SADC 25

  161. Pintegne v Woods [2010] NSWDC 44

  162. Pisani v Lawson (1839) 133 ER 35

  163. Piscioneri v Brisciani [2015] ACTSC 106

  164. Piscioneri v Whitaker [2017] ACTSC 174

  165. PK v BV (No 2) [2008] NSWDC 297

  166. Polias v Ryall [2014] NSWSC 1692

  167. Potts v Moran (1976) 16 SASR 284

  168. Prendergast v Roberts [2012] QSC 144

  169. Prince v Malouf [2014] NSWCA 12

  170. Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton [2009] HCA 16

  171. Random House Australia Pty Ltd v Abbott [1999] FCA 1538

  172. Rastogi v Nolan [2010] NSWSC 735

  173. Ray Chesterton v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 982

  174. Rayney v The State of Western Australia [No 9] [2017] WASC 367

  175. Reader’s Digest Services Pty Ltd v Lamb (1982) 150 CLR 500

  176. Redeemer Baptist School Ltd v Glossop [2006] NSWSC 1201

  177. Reid v Dukic [2016] ACTSC 344

  178. Restifa v Pallotta [2009] NSWSC 958

  179. Ritson v Burns [2014] NSWSC 272

  180. RJ v JC [2008] NSWDC 217

  181. Robertson v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (2003) 58 NSWLR 246

  182. Rogers v Nationwide News Pty Limited [2003] HCA 52

  183. Rothe v Scott (No. 4) [2016] NSWDC 160

  184. Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (NSW) v Davies [2011] NSWSC 1445

  185. Ryan v Premachandran [2009] NSWSC 1186

  186. Scali v Scali [2015] SADC 172

  187. Shandil v Sharma [2010] NSWDC 273

  188. Sheales v The Age & Ors [2017] VSC 380

  189. Sierocki & Anor v Klerck & Ors (No 2) [2015] QSC 92

  190. Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237

  191. Simeone & Anor v Walker & Ors [2009] SASC 201

  192. Slatyer v Daily Telephraph Co Ltd (1908) 6 CLR 1

  193. Smith v Dahlenburg [2008] VSC 557

  194. Smith v Mather (Queensland District Court, Clare SC DCJ, 31 October 2013)

  195. Smith v Stevens [2018] WASC 95

  196. South Hetton Coal Co Ltd v North-Eastern News Ltd [1894] 1 QB 133

  197. Stevens v Boyle [2012] SASC 232

  198. Stevens v Mayberry [2012] SASC 220

  199. Stokes v Ragless [2017] SASC 159

  200. Stone v Moore [2016] SASCFC 50

  201. Sungravure Pty Ltd V Middle East Airlines Airliban SAL (1975) 134 CLR 1

  202. Tabbaa v Nine Network Pty Ltd (No.10) [2018] NSWSC 468

  203. Takhar v Sroa [2017] SADC 110

  204. Tassone v Kirkham [2014] SADC 134

  205. Todd v Swan Television & Radio Pty Ltd (2001) 25 WAR 284

  206. Tournier V. National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461

  207. Trenham v Platinum Traders Pty Ltd & Anor [2012] QDC 347

  208. Trkulja v Google Inc LLC (No 5) [2012] VSC 533

  209. Trkulja v Yahoo! Inc LLC [2012] VSC 88

  210. Tropeano v Lauro [2010] SADC 113

  211. Villers v Monsley (1769) 2 Wils 403

  212. Visscher v Maritime Union of Australia (No 6) [2014] NSWSC 350

  213. Wagner & Ors v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd & Ors [2018] QSC 201

  214. Weatherup v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2016] QSC 266

  215. Webster v Coles Myer Limited; Thompson v Coles Myer Limited [2009] NSWDC 4

  216. Wild v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (Supreme Court of New South Wales, Levine J, 8 August 1997, unreported)

  217. Winn v Goodwin [2008] VCC 1507

  218. Woolcott v Seeger [2010] WASC 19

  219. Y and Z v W [2007] NSWCA 329

  220. Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures Ltd (1934) 50 TLR 581

  221. Yuanjun Holdings Pty Ltd and Ors v Min Luo [2018] VMC 7

  222. Zaia v Eshow [2017] NSWSC 1540

  223. Zbyszko v New York American Inc (1930) 239 NYS 411

  224. Zoef v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 283

  225. Zwambila v Wafawarova [2015] ACTSC 171

8.3. Textbooks and Books

  1. Balkin, R P and J L R Davis, Law of Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th Edition, 2013)

  2. Barker, Kit, Peter Cane, Mark Lunney and Francis Trindade, The Law of Torts in Australia (Oxford University Press, 5th Edition, 2012)

  3. Butler, Des and Sharon Rodrick, Australian Media Law (Thomson Reuters, 5th Edition, 2015)

  4. Collins, Matthew, Collins on Defamation (Oxford University Press, 2014) 

  5. Davies, Martin and Ian Malkin, Focus: Torts (LexisNexis Butterworths, 8th Edition, 2017)

  6. Foster, Neil, Torts Cases and Commentary Supplement: Defamation and Wrongful Interference with Goods (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2014)

  7. George, Patrick, Defamation Law in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd Edition, 2017)

  8. George, Patrick, Monica Allen, Gerard Basha, Stefanie Benson, Joseph Collins, James Mattson, Justine Munsie, Gabriella Rubagotti, Gavin Stuart and James Whiley, Social Media and the Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2nd Edition, 2016)

  9. Hitchens, Lesley, Media Law in Australia (Wolters Kluwer: Law & Business, 2014)

  10. Mendelson, Danuta, The New Law of Torts (Oxford University Press, 3rd Edition, 2014) 

  11. Mendelson, Danuta, The New Law of Torts: Case Book (Oxford University Press, 3rd Edition, 2014)

  12. Pearson, Mark and Mark Polden, The Journalist's Guide to Media Law: A Handbook for Communications in a Digital World (Allen & Unwin, 6th Edition, 2019)

  13. Richards, Bernadette and Melissa De Zwart, Tort Law Principles (Thomson Reuters, 2nd Edition, 2016)

  14. Rolph, David, Defamation Law (Thomson Reuters, 2016) 

  15. Rolph, David, Matt Vitins, Judith Bannister and Daniel Joyce, Media Law: Cases, Materials and Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2nd Edition, 2015)

  16. Sappideen, Caroline and Prue Vines (eds), Fleming′s The Law of Torts (Thomson Reuters, 10th Edition, 2011)

  17. Stickley, Amanda, Australian Torts Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th Edition, 2016)

8.4. Journal Articles

  1. Baker, Roy, ‘Defamation and the Moral Community’ (2008) 13(1) Deakin Law Review 1.

  2. Gould, Kim, 'The Common Law Tests of Defamatory Meaning in the Wake of Radio 2UE Sydney v Chesterton' (2015) 41 Australian Bar Review 44.

8.5. Miscellaneous

  1. Gibson, J C, ‘From McLibel to e-Libel: Recent Issues and Recurrent Problems in Defamation Law’ (Speech, State Legal Convention, 30 March 2015).

  2. Tobin, T K, M G Sexton, LexisNexis, Australian Defamation Law and Practice, Vol 1.

  3. Murthy, Divya, ‘Trends in Digital Defamation: Defendants, Plaintiffs, Platforms’ (Report, The Centre for Media Transition, University of Technology Sydney, 2018).

9. About the Author

Rod Hollier is the founder of The Law Project. He has recently completed a Juris Doctor (law) at RMIT and has clerked for a boutique law firm since 2014. Rod is very serious about research and he strives to take legal knowledge to the next level.

Outside of the law, Rod is a recovering coffee addict, a gym junkie, and he strangely reads textbooks just for fun!

You can find Rod on LinkedIn and Instagram.

 
 
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